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Trading Dams
Dave Owent* & Colin Apse**
Over the pastforty years, environmental tradingsystems have emerged as
one of the primary innovations of American environmental law. In fields
ranging from climate change mitigation to wetlands protection, regulated
entities may now proceed with otherwise proscribed activities in return for
providing extra protection at some other place or time. At their best, these
trades achieve environmental goals while increasingflexibility and lowering
the economic costs of regulation. In practice, that promise has not always
been achieved, and the emergence of environmental trading systems has at
times been quite controversial. But they have become increasinglypervasive.
This Article considers environmental trading in a new context. The
United States contains tens of thousands of dams, and these dams have
drastically altered river systems. While many of these dams also provide
important societal benefits, a major reconfiguration of America's dams
would greatly improve those dams' collective balance between benefits and
harms. To date, that kind of major reconfigurationhas not taken place. But
a restoration project on Maine's Penobscot River illustrates how trading
might create such change. By exchanging reduced environmental regulatory
constraints and increased energy generation in some locations for dam
removals and other environmental improvements elsewhere, the project will
create major environmental improvements without any loss of hydropower.
t Copyright © 2015 Dave Owen & Colin Apse.
* Professor, University of Maine School of Law. We thank audiences at the
Harvard-Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum, Vermont Law School, the University of
San Diego, the University of Denver, the University of Maine, and the University of
California, Hastings for comments on presentations of this article; Fred Ayer, David
Harrison, Jeffrey Opperman, Richard Roos-Collins, andJohn Seebach for discussing this
project at its formative stages; David Adelman, Ralph Cavanagh, Robin Kundis Craig,
Holly Doremus, Simon Geerlofs, Gary Johnson, Christine Klein, Ronald Kreisman,
Justin Pidot, David Policansky, Melissa Scanlan, Sarah Schindler, John Seebach, Mark
Smith, Dan Tarlock, Jeffrey Thaler, Jessica Wilkinson, Hannah Wiseman, and Jennifer
Wriggins for comments on earlier drafts; Elizabeth Valentine and Stephen Wagner for
research assistance; and the staff of UC Davis Law Review for editorial assistance.
- Freshwater Conservation Advisor, The Nature Conservancy.
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Using that project as a model, this Article analyzes how trading systems
might facilitate better reconciliation of the positive benefits and negative
impacts of dams. Our conclusions are qualified; while we argue that trading
systems hold promise, applying them to dams will not be easy. Nevertheless,
the concept is worth pursuing,and we offer a series of legal reforms to that
end. More broadly, the analysis illustrates both the promise and the
challenges that face environmental trading systems as they continue their
expansion through the field of environmental law.
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INTRODUCTION

On the morning of July 22, 2013, an excavator smashed through the
Veazie Dam, allowing the Penobscot River to spill through.' It was a
historic moment. Opposition often unsuccessful to dam
construction helped forge the American environmental movement, and
the removal of any dam therefore carries potent symbolism. 2 This was
no exception. Political figures flocked to the breaching, the Penobscot
Indian Tribe commemorated the event with ceremonies, and the New
York Times described the removal as emblematic "of a nationwide
movement." 3 Dam removals can also bring enormous ecological
benefits, and on this front the Veazie Dam removal seems particularly
promising. Because of its somewhat remote location, the Penobscot
River's profile remains lower than that of Chesapeake Bay, the
Everglades, or California's Bay-Delta - the three tragically flawed icons
of American environmental restoration. 4 But the Penobscot River
Restoration Project, of which the Veazie Dam removal is a key part, is
one of the most ambitious river restoration projects in the world.
Even with these removals, however, the Penobscot remains a dammed
river, and hydropower at some of its remaining dams actually is slated
to increase.5 This, too, reflects a larger story. The United States is the

I SeeAlyssa Botelho, Breaching of Dam, Restoring Salmon's PassageUnite Many, Bos.
GLOBE (July 23, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/maine/2013/07/22/
removal-veazie-dam-maine-penobscot-river-starts-creating-easier-pathway-for-salmon/
90TiLUVoBH4ozythyRsQrK/story.html.
2 See, e.g., ROBERT W. RIGHTER, THE BATTLE OVER HETCH HETCHY: AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DAM AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISM (2005) (describing
how failed opposition to Hetch Hetchy helped create the American environmental
movement). Perhaps the most vivid expression of dams' symbolism comes from John
McPhee, who described a conservationist's layers of Hell, ending at "the absolute
epicenter ... where stands a dam." JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID

158 (1971).
3 Editorial, Down Comes Another Dam, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/07/22/opinion/down-comes-another-dam.html. See generally ASPEN
INST., DAM REMOVAL: A NEW OPTION FOR ANEW CENTURY (2002), available at http://www.
aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/ee/damremovaloption.pdf (providing a
broad study of the science, policy, and law of dam removal).
4 A few statistics capture the difference in profile. On September 15, 2014, a search
of Westlaw's law reviews and journals database for the term "Chesapeake Bay"
generated 2,088 hits. "Everglades" produced 1,464 hits. "Bay-Delta" produced 442 hits.
"Penobscot River" produced eighty-four hits and a narrower search for "Penobscot
River Restoration Project" produced just one hit.
5 See Jeffrey J. Opperman et al., The Penobscot River, Maine, USA: A Basin-Scale
Approach to BalancingPower Generationand Ecosystem Restoration, 16 ECOLOGY& SOC'Y,
no. 3, 2011, availableat http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss3/art7.
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world's leader in dam removals, 6 but the overwhelming majority of its
dams remain in place, with no plans for removal. 7 Hydropower
continues to generate more electricity than all other sources of
renewable energy 8 combined. 9 Many energy policy advocates, as well as
many members of Congress, want more hydropower, particularly at the
many dams that currently generate no hydropower or that could be
upgraded to generate more.10 In the United States, enthusiasm for
building new dams has waned," but in many other nations it remains
strong. 12 The environmental accounting of dams has also evolved, and
dam supporters increasingly can draw upon arguments that ought to
resonate with their traditional adversaries. Often though,
importantly, not always - hydropower is a relatively clean energy

6

See Emily H. Stanley & Martin W. Doyle, Trading Off: The Ecological Effects of

Dam Removal, 1 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY 15, 21 (2003) ("[TIhe vast majority of intentional

removals have occurred in the US.").
7 ASPEN INST., supra note 3, at 4 ("IV] ery few documented dams in the United States
are even being considered for removal.").
8 In this Article, we use the Energy Information Administration's definition of
renewable energy: "renewable energy sources regenerate and can be sustained
indefinitely." Hydropower generally meets this definition - at least until reservoirs fill
with sediment or dams become structurally obsolete. What Is Renewable Energy?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=renewable-

home (last updated Sept. 27, 2013). Some commentators, and some regulatory systems,
include in their definition a sustainability test, which hydropower systems may not pass.
9 See How Much of Our Electricity Is GeneratedFrom Renewable Energy?, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyjin.brief/article/renewable-electricity.cfm (last
updated Apr. 14, 2014) (showing statistics for different energy sources).
10 See KELsI BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42579, HYDROPOWER:
FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL INVESTMENT 1 (2013) ("More than 25 bills dealing with
various aspects of hydropower were introduced in the 112th Congress .... "); see also
Energy Dept. Report Finds Major Potential to Grow Clean, Sustainable U.S. Hydropower,
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY (Apr. 29, 2014), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-dept-reportfinds-major-potential-grow-clean-sustainable-us-hydropower;
Why
Hydropower?,
NAT'L HYDROPOWER ASS'N, http://www.hydro.org/why-hydro

(last visited Sept. 15,

2014).
11 For chronicles of the rise and fall of large-scale hydropower development in the
United States, see MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 1 (rev. ed. 1993); Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78
OR. L. REV. 641,641 (1999); Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Futureof HydroelectricPower
Generation in the United States, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1723, 1723-25 (2012). The most likely
exception to this trend involves Alaska. See Felicity Barringer, Proposed Dam Presents
Economic and Environmental Challenges in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/science/earth/proposed-dam-presents-twin-conundrumsin-alaska.html.
12 See Jingsheng Jia et al., Hydropower, in HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION 1355, 1357-75 (Wei-Yin Chen et al. eds., 2012).
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source, with low emissions of conventional air pollutants and
13
greenhouse gases.
Notwithstanding hydropower's emissions benefits, the tension
between these stories might seem profound, for environmental
advocates have long regarded dams simply as "evil - placed and
solid."' 4 On the Penobscot River, however, the two stories are closely,
and legally, linked in a very different way: the dam removals and
hydropower upgrades all are part of a negotiated deal. 15 The terms of
the agreement are complex, but at its core is a trade. In return for
withholding opposition to continued dam operations at several sites and
for paying the dams' owner a substantial sum of money,
environmentalists and the Penobscot Indian Tribe secured the removal
of two dams, the decommissioning of a third, and upgrades to fish
passage capacity at several others. 16 In other words, the tribe traded
environmental restoration in some places for increased hydropower
generation in others (and, again, for money). The net result will be
quality,
including
environmental
in
major improvements
approximately a thousand miles of additional habitat access for
migratory fish, with no net loss of hydropower capacity. 17 For good
reason, the project has been hailed worldwide as a model.18
The core question considered by this Article is how to replicate that
model and, more specifically, how law can facilitate that replication.
That is an important question, for the need for imitation is much greater
than most people realize. The United States' dams' ecological impacts
are enormous. But energy remains a basic societal need, and other
13

See

WILLIAM STEINHURST ET AL., HYDROPOWER GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: STATE

OF THE RESEARCH 1 (2012) (" IT] he rate of emissions per unit of electric generation from

hydropower (excluding tropical reservoirs) is much lower than for fossil fuel
technologies."); Jia et al., supra note 12, at 1383. Tropical reservoirs have high
greenhouse gas footprints because the decomposition of flooded biomass produces
methane and because flooding displaces forests that previously functioned as carbon
sinks. STEINHURST ET AL., supra, at 14.
14 See MCPHEE, supra note 2, at 159 ("[Plossibly the reaction to dams is so violent
because rivers are the ultimate metaphor for existence, and dams destroy rivers.").
15 See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See, e.g., Giulio Boccaletti, It's a Mistake for NGOs Not to Engage with Hydropower
Companies, CONSERVANCY TALK (Aug. 20, 2013), http://blog.nature.org/conservancy/
20 13/08/20/its-a-mistake- for-ngos-not-to-engage-with-hydropower-companies (citing
the Penobscot project as a global model); Ashish Khotari, Liberatinga River, FRONTLINE
(Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.penobscotriver.org/assets/Liberating-a-river_--Frontline_1-16-09_official copy.pdf ("Even if India does not manage to start decommissioning
its dams, it should certainly learn a lesson from the Penobscot project.").
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energy sources do immense environmental damage.1 9 Projects that
reduce the ecological impacts of dams while maximizing hydropowergenerating capacity therefore would be quite valuable. The potential for
such projects also could be substantial. The United States contains over
87,000 "large" dams, only three percent of which actually generate
hydropower. 20 On many rivers, combining hydropower installations or
upgrades at some locations with environmental restoration projects at
others seems possible, at least as a matter of science and engineering. 21
Similarly, in other countries where dam construction remains a national
priority, 22 more rational siting processes could reduce dams' devastating
impacts on river systems. At the same time, dams could lessen demand
for energy sources, like coal, whose environmental and health impacts
23
can be even worse.

Economic and environmental need alone will not be sufficient to
ensure replication, however. Law matters as well, and here, too, the
Penobscot River Restoration Project shows promise as a model. Though
it applies that concept in a novel setting, the project reflects
environmental law's growing emphasis on trading systems. 24 Such
systems now pervade conventional air quality regulation, and they have
assumed increasingly important roles in greenhouse gas regulation,
19

See generally

ANDREW GUZMAN, OVERHEATED: THE HUMAN COST OF CLIMATE

CHANGE (2013) (describing consequences of climate change, which is caused primarily
by fossil fuel combustion); Bert Brunekreef & Stephen T. Holgate, Air Pollution and
Health, 360 LANCET 1233 (2002) (describing the health impacts of conventional air
pollution, which also is caused primarily by fossil fuel combustion). Energy also is by
no means the only benefit dams can provide. While it is our primary focus in this article,
regulatory systems that improve environmental conditions while maximizing other
benefits of dams also could be quite valuable.
20 See NID National, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS: NAT'L INVENTORY OF DAMS,

http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:5:0::NO (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). The
87,359 number represents the sum of the numbers in the first chart. This inventory
includes dams that "[elqual or exceed 25 feet in height and exceed 15 acre-feet in
storage, [or] leiqual or exceed 50 acre-feet storage and exceed 6 feet in height," as well
as dams that exceed certain hazard thresholds. Home: NID 2013, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG'RS: NAT'L INVENTORY OF DAMS, http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/P.p=397:1:0 (last
visited Nov. 30, 2014).
21 See infra Parts 1l-Ill.
22 See Boccaletti, supra note 18 ("We are entering a new hydro-dam era.").
23

See U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., POTENTIAL HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT AT

EXISTING FEDERAL FACILITIES 33 (2007) (quantifying the displacement). The calculus is
very different, however, if the proposed project would flood a tropical forest. See
STEINHURST ET AL., supra note 13, at 14.
24 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000) [hereinafter Currencies and
Commodification] (describing a "growing interest in market-based instruments").
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wetlands protection, fisheries management, habitat protection, and a
variety of other contexts. 25 Within those many realms, trading systems
come in a wide variety of forms. The archetypal trading system is a capand-trade program, 26 in which trades are numerous, trading currencies
are well-developed, and transaction costs are low. But there are other
programs in which governmental intervention is nearly continuous and
trades resemble bartered deals more than the outputs of a functioning
market. 27 In all of these contexts, trading systems share key common
features. Most importantly, they involve trading increased protection in
some times or places for increased environmental degradation at others,
and they use those trades as means to provide greater flexibility and
economic efficiency. 28 They also have spawned an extraordinary
volume of legal and economic research, and, in some circles, have
become almost synonymous with regulatory innovation. 29 Indeed, some
prominent commentators argue that trading systems are the
economically and democratically optimal mode of regulation, and
therefore should be the central regulatory instrument of environmental
law. 30 Dams, then, might seem like the logical next frontier, and the

Penobscot project, with its impressive balance of environmental

25 See Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Theory and Practice, in MOVING TO
MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

63, 63 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (describing applications).
26 A cap-and-trade program involves placing an overall cap on air pollution
emissions, allocating entitlements to emit shares of that cap, and allowing emitters to
trade their entitlements. See Cap and Trade: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/basic-info.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
27 See generally Tietenberg, supra note 25 (discussing a wide variety of programs).
28 See generally Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24
(explaining the basic elements of environmental trading systems, as well as some of the
key challenges they face). To some environmental lawyers and policy analysts, the
phrase "environmental trading markets" connotes only true cap-and-trade systems. But
others, including us, use a more expansive definition of the phrase. Nevertheless, and
while we think some lessons cut across the field, we acknowledge that the differences
between carbon markets and wetland or dam trading are substantial.
29 See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental
Reform for the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2008)
(arguing that insufficient use of market-based regulatory mechanisms is a central failing
of environmental law).
30 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1985) [hereinafter Reforming Environmental Law]; Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Casefor
Market Incentives, 13 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988) [hereinafter Market
Incentives].
STAN.
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improvement and sustained energy production, would seem to
31
exemplify the possibilities.
Environmental law's forty-year experiment with trading systems,
however, demonstrates that applying trading concepts in this context
would not be simple. While trading systems have succeeded in some
contexts, in others their track record is quite mixed. 3 2 Many theoretical
and empirical critiques of trading systems have helped explain their
uneven record. 33 The history of environmental trading systems therefore
provides grounds for caution, and the cautionary tale clearly applies to
dams. The complexities of dams, and the rivers they occupy, will
probably never allow for anything akin to the high-volume, lowtransaction-cost markets that exist for things like carbon or sulfur dioxide
emissions. Even more barter-like systems will be challenging to create. 34
But that cautionary note should not end the inquiry. A third lesson of
environmental trading systems is that they can be functional, and
useful, even where they never will approach an economist's ideal
market. Trading systems also can become more effective as both
regulators and the regulated learn and adapt. 35 Even in contexts that
never will be optimal for trading systems, they can succeed as
components of broader regulatory regimes. 36 These possibilities inform
our core conclusions, which are that more dam trading should occur;

31 One other article explores this possibility. See James G. Workman, How to Fix
Our Dam Problems, ISSUES ScI. & TECH., Fall 2007, at 31, 39. Our analysis provides more
depth than Workman's, and while we share his conclusion that the idea is worth
exploring, our endorsement of dam trading is more cautious.
32 See, e.g., Karen Fisher-Vanden & Sheila Olmstead, Moving Pollution Trading from
Air to Water: Potential, Problems, and Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 147 (2013)
("While nearly three dozen water pollution trading programs have been established in
the United States, many have seen no trading at all, and few are operating on a scale
that could be considered economically significant."); James Salzman & J.B. RuhI, "No
Net Loss": Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, supra note
25, at 323 [hereinafter No Net Loss] (noting the challenges associated with applying
trading systems to habitat).
33 See, e.g., Laurence H. Goulder, Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the
(New) Lessons?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (2013) (describing positive and negative lessons
learned); Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24 (explaining
challenges that arise when trading systems involve exchanges of incommensurable
things).
34 See infra Part 111.
35 See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of
wetlands mitigation programs).
36 See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text (describing wetlands trading,
which represents just a part of a broader regulatory regime for wetlands protection).
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reforms to facilitate trading should be implemented; and the process of
37
regulatory experimentation and learning should begin.
This Article's analysis proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the status of
dams in the United States, discussing their current and potential value,
their environmental harms, and the complex legal regimes to which
they are subject. That analysis underscores the need for more projects
like the Penobscot, as well as the extent to which dams, which lately
have lacked the legal-academic cachet of wind, solar, or fracking,
remain crucially important for energy and environmental law. Part II
describes the Penobscot River Restoration Project in more detail. Part
III then draws on the history and literature of environmental trading
systems to evaluate their potential application to dams, and to identify
factors that could facilitate or discourage other projects like the
Penobscot. Part IV builds on that evaluation to recommend reforms that
would make dam trading a more widespread option.
In describing those reforms, and in providing a broader analysis of
the possibilities for dam trading, we offer three primary contributions
to the existing literature. Most importantly, we identify steps that would
help reconcile society's interest in reducing the massive environmental
impacts of dams with its need for non-fossil fuel energy. While many
articles have focused on the former problem, 38 and some, more recently,
have considered hydropower's potential contributions to the latter
goal,39 none has provided an in-depth analysis of the extent to which
these seemingly opposing goals may be legally reconciled. 40 Relatedly,
137 While we focus upon dams, there are other fish passage barriers, like culverts,
that could be drawn into trading schemes.
38 For discussions of the environmental impact of dams, see Michael C. Blumm &
Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest: Lessons for the Nation, 42
ENVTL. L. 1043, 1043 (2012); and Margaret B. Bowman, Legal Perspectives on Dam
Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 739, 739 (2002).
39 For a discussion of hydropower's potential contributions to society's need for
non-fossil fuel energy, see Lea Kosnik, The Potentialof Water Power in the Fight Against
Global Warming in the US, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 3252, 3252 (2008); and Gina S. Warren,
Hydropower: Time for a Small Makeover, 24 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 249 (2014).
40 Federal agencies have recently explored projects that could link hydropower
expansion with environmental improvement, but they have not analyzed - at least in
any publicly available documents - the legal steps necessary to accomplish those goals.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING FOR HYDROPOWER AMONG THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (2010), available at

http://www.usbr.gov/power/SignedHydropowerMOU.pdf (memorializing an agreement
between the Department of the interior, the Department of Energy, and the Department
of Army); Simon Geerlofs et al., The Deschutes River Basin Scale Opportunities
Assessment: A National Initiative to Help a Basin Increase Hydropower, Improve
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this Article provides the broadest analysis of which we are aware of the
legal incentive structures that drive or, more often, inhibit thoughtful
management of our system of dams. Our final contribution is to provide
a window into a cutting edge of environmental trading systems, which
have evolved considerably since they first emerged in the 1970s and
1980s. 41 An analysis of dams illustrates both emerging possibilities and
continuing challenges.
I.

THE PREVALENCE, LAW, AND ECOLOGY OF DAMS

In any legal system, the desirability of new regulatory instruments
depends in large part on the nature of the things being regulated and
the structure of the existing legal regime. Dams are no exception, and
this Part therefore provides a background account of the United States'
dams and their governing laws. Although the law, economics, and
ecology of dams are complicated, the basic point is straightforward: our
physical system of dams is enormous and in many ways outdated, and
reconfiguring that system could produce major social and
environmental benefits. But existing legal systems do little to encourage
such reconfiguration and in some ways are impediments to change.
Consequently, any regulatory reform that better reconciles the benefits
and costs of dams, which is exactly what trading systems are supposed
to do, would be a significant improvement.
A.

The Continued Importanceof Dams

Perhaps the best indicator of the continued importance of dams, and
the law governing them, lies in sheer numbers. According to the
National Inventory of Dams, there are over 87,359 dams in the United
States. 42 The actual number is significantly higher, for the inventory
includes only dams that meet certain size or safety thresholds, and one
recent study estimated that an additional two million smaller dams

Environmental Sustainability While Considering Other Basin Values, RIVER MGMT. SOC'Y
J., Winter 2011, at 8 (exploring opportunities to improve river management in Oregon's
Deschutes basin).
41 See JESSICA

B. WILKINSON

ET AL., THE NEXT GENERATION OF MITIGATION: LINKING

CURRENT AND FUTURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS WITH STATE WILDLIFE ACTION PLANS AND
OTHER STATE AND REGIONAL PLANS 1 (2009); Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the

Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 219-20 [hereinafter
Mapping, Modeling].
42 See NID National, supra note 20. The 87,359 number represents the sum of the
numbers in the first chart.
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populate the American landscape. 43 Even based on the inventory
number alone, the United States contains approximately one dam for
every day the nation has been in existence. 44 Because of those dams, the
United States' river systems are heavily and pervasively engineered, so
much so that a free-flowing river, for most Americans, is an exotic
concept. 45 For example, the Hudson River basin alone contains over
1,726 dams,46 which translates to approximately one dam for every
47
eight miles of stream or river.
Collectively, dams serve a wide variety of purposes, including
providing water supply, recreation, and flood control. Among those
many purposes, one of the most important - and a central focus of this
Article is generating hydropower. According to the Energy
Information Administration, hydropower generated approximately
seven percent of the United States' electricity in 2013.48 While that
number may seem small, and is less than the global average of 16%, a
few comparisons place it in perspective. 49 Based on the EIA's 2013
figures, hydropower generated twice as much electricity as wind and
approximately twenty-six times as much energy as solar power. 50 The
EIA's projections show those gaps closing, with hydropower in
moderate decline and other renewable energy sources growing.51 But
43 See NID National, supra note 20; see also N. Leroy Poff & David D. Hart, How
Danis Vary and Why It Mattersfor the Emerging Science of Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE
659, 662 (2002). Many culverts and roadway bridges obstruct fish passage and thus
replicate some of the negative environmental impacts of dams.
44 See Bruce Babbitt, Dams Must Be Looked at Critically, with Eye Toward
Environment, WIS. ST. J., Nov. 29, 1998, at 3B, available at Newsbank, Doc. No.
9812010076. Since Babbitt wrote, the number of days has grown, but so too has the
number of documented dams.
45 In fact, in some long-dammed areas, even river ecologists misunderstood what
an undammed stream would look like. See Robert C. Walters & Dorothy J. Merrill,
Natural Streams and the Legacy of Water-Powered Mills, 319 Sci. 299, 299 (2008)
(concluding that conventional wisdom about the natural morphology of many East
Coast streams was incorrect).
46 Any dam tally necessitates a choice about how big a dam must be to count and a
different size threshold would produce a different result.
47 ERIK H. MARTIN & COLIN D. APSE, NORTHEAST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY: AN
ASSESSMENT OF DAMS ON NORTHEASTERN RIVERS
AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY].

67 (2011) thereinafter

NORTHEAST

48

See How Much of Our Electricity Is GeneratedFrom Renewable Energy?, supra note 9.

49

INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP: HYDROPOWER

7 (2012) ("It plays an

important role in today's electricity mix, contributing to more than 16% of electricity
generation worldwide and about 85% of global renewable electricity.").
50 See How Much of Our Electricity Is GeneratedFrom Renewable Energy?, supra note 9.
51 Id. Other sources, however, suggest that hydropower may grow significantly. See

e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF

ENERGY, WATER POWER FOR A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE

3 (2013) ("DOE
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even if those trends continue, hydropower will remain the United States'
predominant source of renewable energy for several more years.52 In
many other countries, that dominance is even more pronounced. 53
The energy generated by hydropower also is particularly important.
Its cost per kilowatt hour can be relatively low, and it also provides
energy managers with important flexibility.54 Water discharges through
turbines can be shifted to periods of higher energy demand, 55 and
hydropower also can dispatch to a grid with minimal startup time,
making it an important source following blackouts. 56 As intermittent
sources like wind and solar grow more prevalent, that flexibility is likely
to become increasingly valuable. 57 Perhaps most importantly, most of
the United States' hydropower is nearly emissions-free,58 while fossil
fuel combustion generates most of the United States conventional air
pollutants and greenhouse gases. 59 Consequently, if hydropower
substitutes for fossil fuel energy generation or provides the flexibility
that allows increased reliance on other renewable sources, it offers an
enormous environmental benefit. 60

While hydropower is one of the most important societal benefits
provided by dams, most dams do not actually generate hydropower.
According to a recent study from the Idaho National Laboratory, "[TIhe
United States hydroelectric plant population is comprised of 2,388
licensed plants." 61 That number may sound large, but it means that
approximately 97% of the dams in the national inventory do not
is currently developing an aggressive strategy to support its vision of the nation
obtaining 15% of its electricity needs from water power by 2030.").
52 See How Much of Our Electricity Is Generated From Renewable Energy?, supra note 9.
53 See Use and Capacity of Global Hydropower Increases, WORLDWATCH INST. (Jan. 7,
2012), http://www.worldwatch.org/use-and-capacity-global-hydropower-increases.
54 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DAMS AND ENERGY SECTORS

INTERDEPENDENCE STUDY 7-8 (2011) (providing reasons why "[hlydropower is critical
to the national economy and the overall energy reliability").
55 Those shifts may have adverse environmental consequences, however. See infra
notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
56 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 54, at 8.
57

See

TOMMY VITOLO ET AL., MEETING LOAD WITH A RESOURCE Mix BEYOND BUSINESS

AS USUAL 9-10, 12, 14 (2013)
reliability).

(describing hydropower's contribution to system

58 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 54, at 8.

59 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
60 Of course, if hydropower substitutes for other renewable sources or energy
conservation that advantage disappears.
61 DOUGLAS G. HALL & KELLY S. REEVES, A STUDY OF UNITED STATES HYDROELECTRIC
PLANT OWNERSHIP

1 (2006).
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produce hydropower. That percentage is somewhat misleading, for
hydropower tends to be generated at larger dams, and most of the nonproducing dams are relatively small. 62 Nevertheless, the huge number
of dams that produce no hydropower has sparked widespread interest
in increasing our hydropower capacity. 63 In addition to those dams,
locks and other waterworks could be fitted with hydropower
equipment, and dams with older turbines could be upgraded. 64 The
extent to which those upgrades would be environmentally and
economically feasible is a more difficult question - and also a question
whose answer depends on the regulatory regime for, and economics of,

other energy sources. 65 Nevertheless, a series of studies shows that even
under existing regulatory and economic conditions, the power upgrades
66
on some of the Penobscot River dams could be replicated elsewhere.
The absence of hydropower at many existing dams underscores a
larger point: some dams are less valuable than others, and some are not
valuable at all. In addition to hydropower, many dams play valuable
roles in storing water supplies, supporting recreation, and reducing
floods.67 But other dams have long outlived their original purposes; the
northeastern United States, for example, is filled with milldams that
have long outlasted their mills. 68 Dams also become structurally
62 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 23, at 38 ("All other things being

equal, hydroelectric facilities become less expensive per unit of generation as they
become larger.").
63 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. HALL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT OF
THE WATER ENERGY RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR NEW Low POWER AND SMALL

HYDRO CLASSES OF HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS (2006) (assessing the potential for developing
new hydropower facilities); MWH GLOBAL, INC., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT
OF POTENTIAL CAPACITY INCREASES AT EXISTING HYDROPOWER PLANTS (2010) (studying

the potential for upgrades at dams managed by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 23 (assessing that potential

at all federal facilities).
64 See e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 23, app. 9-1 (showing sites
with favorable cost-benefit ratios; many are locks).
65 MWH GLOBAL, INC., supra note 63, at ES-2 (finding very modest potential for
upgrades); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 23, at 36 ("Numerous national

studies of hydropower potential have reported thousands of undeveloped sites but
ignore the economic and regulatory barriers that may confront those sites.").
66 A particularly optimistic estimate comes from a 2006 Department of Energy
Study, which concludes that 130,000 new small or low-power hydro sites could be
developed, resulting in 30,000 MW of new power supply. See HALL ET AL., supra note
63, at 21, 35.
67 See Benefits of Dams, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.: FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.

AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/benefits-dams (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).
68 See HEINZ CTR., DAM REMOVAL: SCIENCE AND DECISION MAKING 44-45 (2002)

(documenting reasons for obsolescence).
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obsolete as trapped sediment fills in their reservoirs and their structures
decay. 69 Over time, these dams can turn into public hazards. 70 Others
never made much sense, for the history of dam planning is filled with
stories of pork-barrel boondoggles justified by fictitious cost-benefit
analyses.71 Despite that history, many dams continue to provide
significant societal benefits, and others could be upgraded to serve more
modern purposes. 72 But our present system of dams remains quite
different from one optimally designed to serve contemporary needs.
For the legal field, the continued importance of dams has significant
implications. In practice, at least, the law of dams has never really faded
away. For decades, dams have been generating cases by the dozens, and
hydropower licensing remains an important and active sub-field of
energy and environmental law. 73 Nevertheless, while recent years have

brought an energy law boom, academics and activists have focused
primarily on wind, solar, and the enormous expansion in domestic oil
and gas generation. One could easily form the impression that dams are
nowhere near the cutting edge of energy law. But the continued
prevalence of dams and the potential for upgrades, as well as pervasive
problems with our existing dam systems, raise the possibility of a very
different future, with major changes in our existing dam system helping
hydropower reemerge as a dynamic and growing area of law.

69 See Stanley & Doyle, supra note 6, at 16.
70 See WAYNEJ. GRAHAM, A PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING Loss OF LIFE CAUSED BY DAM
FAILURE 1-10 (1999).
71 See WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING, at ii (2000) ("[T] his century we have collectively bought, on average,
one large dam per day, and there have been precious few, if any, comprehensive,
independent analyses as to why dams came about, how dams perform over time, and
whether we are getting a fair return from our $2 trillion investment."). See generally
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM: How PORK-BARREL POLITICS
ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A RIVER (2013) (chronicling the story of the

Tellico Dam); REISNER, supra note 11 (describing the pork-barrel politics of the United
States dam-building era).
72 Sometimes, however, removals cost less than upgrades. HEINZ CTR., supra note
68, at 44.
73 The frequency with which dams appear on the United States Supreme Court's
limited docket provides one indicator of that importance. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 511 (2012); PPL Mont. LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct.
1215, 1215 (2012); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 256 (2010); S.D.
Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370,370 (2006); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
Cnty. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 700 (1994); and a long list of interstate

water disputes represent cases where dam operations were directly at issue.
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The Adverse Impacts of Dams

While the conventional story of dams may miss their potential to be
a dynamic and growing source of relatively carbon-free energy, there is
another important respect in which that story is spot-on. Dams cause
74
enormous environmental harms.
Dams impact aquatic systems in many ways. Most obviously, most
dams flood land behind the dam. 75 Dams also affect downstream flow,
particularly if the flow schedule is governed by hydropower or other
human needs.7 6 The annual hydrograph of a dam-managed river is often
quite different from an undammed stream, and those fluctuations can
wreak havoc on downstream species that have adapted to a natural flow
regime. 77 Dams also can decrease the aggregate amount of water flowing
downstream, both because of evaporation and because many dams
operate in conjunction with off-stream water supply projects. 78 And
dams can starve downstream reaches of sediment, which again can
79
dramatically alter downstream habitats.
All of those impacts are pervasive, but perhaps the most significant
ecological impact of dams is to limit the movement of aquatic species.
Many rivers play important roles in the lifecycle of diadromous species,
like salmon or shad, which migrate between fresh and salt water.80
Those species in turn can play central roles in the ecology of river
systems, both by providing prey for other species and by moving huge

74

See generally

MICHAEL COLLIER ET AL.,

DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF DAMS

DAMS AND RIVERS:

A

PRIMER ON THE

(1996) (describing many negative impacts). Dam

construction also can be a major human rights issue. For a discussion of such problems,
see Donald K. Anton & Dinah L. Shelton, Problems in Human Rights and Large Dams
(Australian Nat'l Univ. Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 11-18, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1873030.
75 Reservoirs cover approximately three percent of the United States' land area.
COLLIER ET AL., supra note 74, at 2; see also Tarlock, supra note 11, at 1737.
76 For a discussion of such effects, see, for example, Stuart E. Bunn & Angela H.
Arthington, Basic Principles and Ecological Consequences of Altered Flow Regimes for
Aquatic Biodiversity, 30 ENVTL. MGMT. 492, 492 (2002).
77 See Poff & Hart, supra note 43, at 660.
78 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 908-12
(E.D. Cal. 2004) (describing how the Friant Dam and associated diversions dried up the
San Joaquin River).
79 See e.g., COLLIER ET AL., supra note 74, at 24-37, 58-79 (describing effects of
sediment entrapment).
80 For a summary of different types of diadromous life cycles, seeJOHN WALDMAN,
RUNNING

(2013).

SILVER: RESTORING ATLANTIC RIVERS AND THEIR GREAT FISH MIGRATIONS
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quantities of nutrients between oceans and rivers. 81 By blocking access
to habitat, dams can devastate those species' populations, with ripple
effects on all the other species, including humans, that depend on their
migrations.8 2 Dams also can adversely affect resident species that do not
migrate out of the river system. Barriers can prevent these species from
relocating in response to habitat stress or seasonal changes, and they
can promote inbreeding within isolated populations. 83 When a portion
of a watershed loses its population of a species to disease or some other
disturbance, barriers can prevent repopulation from areas where the
84
species has survived.
The scale of these impacts has been profound. To provide one
example, a single board blocking a fish ladder on Maine's St. Croix River
caused a migratory population of alewives to drop from 2.6 million to

900 fish in the span of just seven years. 85 That story is not unique, and
the aggregate impact of tens of thousands of migration barriers is
sufficiently pervasive that few people even realize how productive many
river systems once were. 86 Before the industrial revolution, East Coast
fish runs were so abundant that, in one explorer's creative phrasing, "it
seemed to mee, that one might goe over their backs drishod."87 Even as
late as 1832, the Potomac River shad catch was over fifty-one million

81 See DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE KING OF FISH: THE THOUSAND-YEAR RUN OF SALMON

29 (2003) ("Trees growing along salmon-bearing streams grow up to three times faster
than those growing along salmon-free streams."); WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 15-17.
82 The impacts can affect even sedentary species, like mussels, that rely on
migratory fish as vectors for movement. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 128.
83 See, e.g., Lukas P. Neraas & Paul Spruell, Fragmentationof Riverine Systems: The
Genetic Effects of Dams on Bull Trout (Salvelinus Confluentus) in the Clark Fork River
System, 10 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 1153 (2001) (documenting outbreeding depression
among bull trout); Poff & Hart, supra note 43, at 660 (discussing impacts of habitat
fragmentation).
84 See, e.g., Kentaro Morita & Shoichiro Yamamoto, Effects of HabitatFragmentation
by Damming on the Persistence of Stream-Dwelling CharrPopulations, 16 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1318 (2002) (finding an increased likelihood of extirpation for isolated
populations).
85 See Colin Woodard, EPA OrdersState: Open St. Croix to Alewives, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (July 11, 2012), http://www.pressherald.com/2012/07/11/epa-orders-stateopen-st_-croix-to-alewives_2012-07-1 1/.
86 See Poff & Hart, supra note 43, at 660 ("Dams occur so frequently in many
watersheds that the cumulative ecological effects are likely to be profound."). For
discussion of the impacts of culverts and the legal repercussions of those impacts, see
United States v. Washington, No. CV 9213, 2013 WL 9668852, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
9, 2013).
87 WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 2 (compiling similar quotations, many wonderfully
overwritten). This particular quote comes from a letter written by Captain John Smith.
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kilograms.8 8 The demise of the East Coast runs initially generated
conflicts, fought with guns as well as petitions and legal briefs, and in
the time of the United States' Founding Fathers, legal battles over fish
passage were recurring phenomena (and phenomena in which the
Founding Fathers themselves participated).8 9 But outside of a few relic
runs, that abundance has long since been lost, not just to river systems
but also to cultural memory. 90 On the West Coast, where dams came
later, some cultural memories remain, but migratory fish still have gone
from storied abundance to chronic endangerment. 91 The changes aren't
limited to iconic migrants, or even to fish. Aquatic freshwater species
now are more likely to be listed as threatened or endangered than any
other class of species, and dams and diversions are among the largest
92
threats to their survival.
Of course, not all of the environmental impacts are negative. Some
popular sport species thrive in dam-altered environments. 93 Dams can
prevent the migration of invasive as well as native species. 94 Reservoirs
allow flatwater boating, and altered flows also can support recreation in
9
downstream areas where summer flows otherwise would be too low. 5

88 See Karen E. Limburg & John A. Waldman, DramaticDeclines in North American
Anadromous Fisheries, 59 BIOSCIENCE 955, 959 (2009).
89 See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 83-95. See generally John F. Hart, Fish, Dams,
and James Madison: Eighteenth-CenturySpecies Protection and the Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REV. 287, 292-306 (2004) [hereinafter Fish, Dams, and
James Madison] (describing some of these legal battles); Friends of Sebago Lake et al.,
Supplemental Historic Records Related to the Anadromous Fisheries of the Presumpscot
(2002),
River and Sebago Lake, Maine, ATL. SALMON HISTORY PROJECT
http://home.gwi.net/-fks/presumpoverview.html (describing legal battles).
90 See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 63-71 (discussing the implications of this loss).
91 See generally JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE

PACIFIC SALMON CRISIS (1999) (chronicling the demise of salmon runs on the West
Coast).
92 See Brian D. Richter et al., Threats to Imperiled Freshwater Fauna, 11
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1081, 1082 (1997) ("By virtually any measure, a large
proportion of the world's freshwater fauna appears vulnerable to extinction."); David S.
Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BIoSCIENCE
607, 610 (1998) ("Ninety-one percent of endangered fish and 99% of endangered
mussels are affected by water development ....").
93 See Donald C.Jackson & Gerd Marmulla, The Influence of Dams on River Fisheries,

in

DAMS, FISH, AND FISHERIES: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND CONFLICT 1, 30

(Gerd

Marmulla ed., 2001) (describing dam-dependent recreational fisheries).
94 See P.S. Kemp & J.R. O'Hanley, Procedures for Evaluating and Prioritisingthe
Removal of Fish Passage Barriers:A Synthesis, 17 FISHERIES MGMT. & ECOLOGY 297, 316
(2010).
95 See e.g., COLLIER ET AL., supra note 74, at 42 (noting that recreational users of
Georgia's Lake Sydney Lanier "spent $422 million recreating here in 1990").
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Finally, to the extent that hydropower obviates the need to burn oil,
natural gas, or coal, dams provide an important environmental benefit
to river systems, for climate change also ranks high as a threat to
freshwater ecosystems. 96 In short, dams present environmental
tradeoffs, and sometimes environmental damage is in the eye of the
beholder. Nevertheless, there is little debate that the environmental
impact of many dams, both individually and cumulatively, is
profoundly negative. 97
One consequence of these impacts has been to generate interest in
dam removal. Twenty-five years ago, the idea was largely a novelty,
though occasional dam removals have occurred throughout American
history. 98 But beginning in the 1990s, the idea went mainstream. 99
Hundreds of dams have come out, and while most of the removals have
involved small structures, a few medium-sized dams have recently been
removed. 100 The trend is still a minor one; while dam removals tend to
grab attention, only a small percentage of the United States dams have
actually come out. 101 Dam removal also is not a panacea, for removals
are unlikely to completely restore rivers to their prior condition.102 But
the improvements are often fast and dramatic. 103 Consequently, even if
dam removal remains an incomplete and, to date, relatively rare
approach to environmental restoration, it still holds transformative
potential for many river systems.
To date, those removals have been largely opportunistic; rarely have
dams come out pursuant to some larger plan. 104 But impacts vary
96

See Ashley D. Ficke et al., Potential Impacts of Global Climate Change on

FreshwaterFisheries, 17 REV. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 581, 603-04 (2007).
97 See generally WALDMAN, supra note 80 (discussing these impacts).

98 See Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison, supra note 89, at 289 ("Occasionally
dams were ordered to be torn down altogether because they were found to be
incompatible with fish passage.").
99 See generally Klein, supra note 11 (describing the United States' shift away from
the dam-building era).
100 See HEINZ CTR., supra note 68, at 50 ("Almost all dams removed thus far have
been small ones ....
). See generally Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38 (describing
major dam removal projects in the Pacific Northwest).
101 To date, American Rivers has documented 1,150 dam removals, which would
represent approximately one percent of the total number of dams in the Army Corps of
Engineers' inventory. See Questions About Removing Dams, AM. RIVERS,
http://www.americanrivers.org/initiatives/dams/faqs/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
However, American Rivers cautions that it is "still in the process of gathering data." Id.
102 See Stanley & Doyle, supra note 6, at 15.
103 See Kemp & O'Hanley, supra note 94, at 303 ("The well-planned removal of
barriers can be a highly effective means of river restoration .... ).
104 See generally HEINZ CTR., supra note 68, at 40-53 (discussing typical reasons for
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significantly from dam to dam, and that variance creates opportunities
for prioritization. 05 Obviously size matters, and a large dam generally
will have greater impacts than a smaller one. 106 Location also is
important. A dam near a natural fish barrier, or upstream of another
dam, will do less ecological damage than one that blocks access to many
miles of habitat. 10 7 The design of dams also is important. For example,
some have better fish passage systems than others, and some have no
fish passage at all. 108 Similarly, a dam operated in run-of-the-river
mode' 09 will generally have lower impacts than one that creates a large
reservoir as it retains inflows. 110 Finally, the extent to which the dam
alters the downstream flow regime can make a substantial difference,
and mimicking the natural flow regime can reduce, though not
eliminate, some of a dam's adverse effects." 11 Consequently, when
engineers consider where and how to build dams, or when regulators
consider where to require fish passage, flow changes or dam removals,
there are significant differences between the environmental impacts of
2
alternative proposals."1

dam removal).
105 See generally Poff & Hart, supra note 43 (discussing ways dams differ).
106 See generally Lea Kosnik, The Potentialfor Small Scale Hydropower Development
in the U.S., 38 ENERGY POL'Y 5512 (2010) (arguing that smaller dams do not have the
negative impacts associated with larger ones). But see Tasneem Abbasi & S.A. Abbasi,
Small Hydro and the Environmental Implications of Its Extensive Utilization, 15
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 2134, 2141 (2011) (arguing that the
environmental arguments for small hydropower facilities overlook the cumulative
impacts of building many such facilities).
107 See Kemp & O'Hanley, supra note 94, at 302-06.
108 For a detailed discussion of fish passage systems, see Carl R. Schilt, Developing
Fish Passageand Protection at Hydropower Dams, 104 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 295,
301-04 (2007).
109 See Poff & Hart, supra 43, at 661 (stating that a run-of-the-river dam lacks a
significant impoundment and makes minimal changes to the amount or timing of water
flowing downstream).
110 See id. (describing run-of-the-river dams). See generally KARIN KRCHNAK ET AL.,
WATER WORKING NOTES, INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS INTO HYDROPOWER DAM
PLANNING, DESIGN, AND OPERATIONS (2009) (describing ways to operate dams to create

more environmentally sensitive flow regimes). This generalization might not apply,
however, to a run-of-the-river dam that diverts water from a relatively long reach.
111 For a discussion of reducing a dam's adverse effects, see Brian D. Richter &
Gregory A. Thomas, Restoring Environmental Flows by Altering Dam Operations, 12
ECOLOGY & SoC'Y, no. 3, 2007, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vo112/
issl/artl2.
112 See generally Kemp & O'Hanley, supra note 94 (describing research on dam
removal prioritization).
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The Legal Regime

The central point of the preceding discussion is that our system of
dams is enormous, influential, and haphazardly matched to modern
societal needs. Ideally, our response would be a broad program of dam
reform, in which many dams come out and others are re-operated to
produce different benefits - including, sometimes, more hydropower
- and in which those adjustments follow careful planning efforts
designed to identify the best places for changes. The extent to which
that response can occur, however, depends partly upon law, and this
section therefore reviews the laws of dams. It is necessarily a brief
overview, for these laws are much too complex to describe in detail in
a few pages. Nevertheless, even this brief summary should illustrate two
overarching points. First, key parts of existing law create a strong bias
toward the status quo, and against any actions that would either
generate new hydropower or lead to dam removals. Second, while the
system allows systemic reassessment of dams, it does almost nothing to
compel such analysis. It is, in short, a system suited primarily for
sporadic, ad hoc adjustments.
1.

Federally-Regulated Hydropower Dams

The most extensive legal regime applies to hydropower dams that are
licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). 113
FERC has jurisdiction over all hydroelectric dams located on waterways
to which federal commerce clause or public lands authority extends.1 14
Only a small percentage of dams meet those criteria; because most dams
do not generate hydropower, they fall outside FERC's jurisdiction, as
do the dams that the federal government itself owns. 115 Nevertheless,
hydropower dams are often relatively big, and FERC-regulated dams

113

A possible exception to that claim is the set of dams governed by the Pacific

Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, which governs hydroelectric
dams on the Columbia River and its tributaries. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (2013).
Detailed discussion of that act is beyond the scope of this paper, but for a useful
summary see Power Act: Summary, Nw. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL (May 14,
2013), http://www.nwcouncil.org/reports/poweract/summary.
114 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2013); see also id. § 817 (2013) (allowing construction,
without a FERC license, of hydroelectric facilities on waterways to which the federal
commerce and lands powers do not extend, but only after notice to FERC). FERC may
exempt hydropower projects with less than 10 MW generating capacity from some of
the FPA's requirements. Id. § 2705 (2013).
115 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.

20151

Trading Dams

1063

therefore produce a disproportionate share of social benefits and
11 6
environmental costs.

The core statute governing FERC's hydropower licensing authority is
the Federal Power Act ("FPA"). 117 The FPA contains detailed
procedural provisions setting forth the requirements for licensing
processes,11 8 defines the substantive standards FERC must use to
evaluate license applications,' 1 9 and also defines the boundaries
between state and federal authority over hydropower systems.120 For
decades, FERC interpreted and applied those provisions in ways that
favored strong federal authority and expanding hydropower, and the
agency was widely perceived as closely aligned with, and perhaps
captured by, the industry it was charged with regulating. 12' Congress
often encouraged that alignment. Even in the 1970s, after the dawn of
the environmental law era, an energy-hungry Congress continued to
22
create incentives for aggressive hydropower development.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the tide began to turn, and a series
of legal changes turned the FPA into a more environmentally protective
statute. 23 Some of those changes were internal to the FPA. Congress
made environmental protection one of the core goals of the licensing
process, and it also empowered other government agencies to demand
that FERC condition licenses upon environmental protection measures,
including the installation of facilities to allow fish passage.1 24 Some
FERC-regulated dams tend to be larger than non-hydropower dams and smaller
owned dams. See HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at v.
federally
than
117 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (2013); see also J.R. DeShazo &Jody Freeman, Public
Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2235-36, 2258-60 (2005) (describing
passage of the statute and later amendments).
118 See 16 U.S.C. § 800 (2013) (setting procedures for preliminary licenses), 802
(informational requirements for license applications); id. § 808 (2013) (license
renewals); id. § 820 (2013) (license revocations).
119 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803 (2013).
120 See, e.g., id. § 821 (2013) (partially preempting and partially preserving state
authority); California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 497, 506
(1990) (concluding that section 821 preserves state authority over water rights but not
state authority to require instream flows).
121 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117, at 2236-41.
122 Id. at 2243 ("A biologist working at FERC at the time described the package of
incentives as a license to print money for hydropower.").
123 Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the
Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 87-96
(2001); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117, at 2252-63.
124 Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, § 3(a), 100 Stat.
1243 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006)) (granting federal land
management agencies authority to impose conditions for projects located within their
116
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derived from other environmental statutes. Most importantly, FERC
must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),
which requires detailed assessments of the environmental impacts of
licensing decisions; 25 the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), which
prohibits FERC from approving actions that would "jeopardize" the
continued existence of protected species or adversely modify their
"critical habitat," and also limits "take" of protected species; 2 6 and
section 401 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which obligates license
applicants to obtain certifications that their proposed operations will be
consistent with state water quality standards. 127 FERC initially resisted
these requirements, but federal court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s
made clear that each was mandatory. 128 These requirements give
environmental regulators and advocates ample influence on licensing,
and sometimes that influence produces dramatic changes. 129 Nearly
every FERC license includes conditions designed to provide
environmental protection, and occasionally the proposed conditions are
sufficiently costly that dam owners elect to cease operation or, at least,
to enter negotiations over possible dam removals.130
Nevertheless, there are other ways in which the FERC process limits
environmental regulators' and activists' leverage. Perhaps the most
important is the duration of the licenses. FERC typically issues licenses
for forty-year terms, and sometimes for longer. 131 While some legal

reservations); 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) (2013) (allowing the FWS and NMFS to request
conditions designed "to adequately and equitably protect, mitigate damages to, and
enhance, fish and wildlife"); id. § 811 (2013) ("The Commission shall require ... such
fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of
Commerce, as appropriate."). In theory, FERC was obligated to consult with other
agencies prior to 1986, but it "did so rather half-heartedly, at best." DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 117, at 2223.
125 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2013).
126 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2013).
127 See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2013); see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep't
of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722-23 (1994).
128 E.g., PUD No. I of Jefferson Cnty., 511 U.S. at 722-23; Escondido Mut. Water Co.
v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984) (holding that FERC must
include in its licenses conditions imposed pursuant to FPA section 4(e)); Am. Rivers v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 201 F.3d 1 186, 1206-11 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
FWS's and NMFS's fishway prescriptions are mandatory).
129 See generally DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117 (documenting the effectiveness
of lobbying by other agencies).
130 See, e.g., Jeff Crane, "Setting the River Free": The Removal of the Edwards Dam and
the Restoration of the Kennebec River, 1 WATER HIST. 131, 135-43 (2009) (explaining
circumstances that led to negotiations over and then removal of the Edwards Dam).
131 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2013) ("Licenses under this subchapter shall be issued for a
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obligations apply throughout the term of the license, and while FERC
often includes "reopener" clauses allowing it to initiate proceedings to
adjust the license terms, 32 the federal agency action necessary to trigger
CWA section 401, NEPA, or section 7 of the ESA is absent in the period
between licensing proceedings. 133 The FPA's relicensing requirements
also favor the status quo in other ways. If a license expires without being
replaced, which can happen if the relicensing proceeding becomes
protracted, the default outcome is to replace the old license with a oneyear license on the same terms.' 34 That provides licensees with a favorable
fallback option, particularly if, as is often the case, the proposed new
license is likely to have more environmentally restrictive terms. Similarly,
in 2005, Congress amended the FPA's procedural requirements to allow
licensees to request evidentiary hearings on proposed fish-protection
conditions.135 The apparent intent of these amendments was to make the
imposition of environmental constraints more procedurally difficult for
the regulating agencies.' 36 Preliminary anecdotal evidence suggests that
37
Congress succeeded in achieving that goal.'
The net result of all of these legal provisions (and others not
summarized here) has been to turn FERC licensing into one of the most
complex processes in all of environmental law. To try to rationalize and
accelerate the process, and to provide a better format for integrating
input from the many other agencies, advocacy groups, and members of
the public that typically participate, FERC has developed an "alternative
licensing process" and, more recently, an "integrated licensing
process."' 138 FERC also encourages stakeholders to reach settlements
period not exceeding fifty years.").
132 See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N,

HYDROPOWER LICENSING AND ENDANGERED SPECIES:

A GUIDE FOR APPLICANTS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFF 53 (2001) (providing a standard
"reopener" clause for fish and wildlife protection).
133 See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 472 F.3d
593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that despite the existence of a "re-opener
clause," ongoing operations under a valid FERC license did not require consultation).
134 See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (2013).
135 See id. §§ 797(e), 811 (2013) (creating an entitlement "to a determination on the
record, after opportunity for an agency trial-type hearing of no more than 90 days, on
any disputed issues of material fact with respect to" conditions or fishway
requirements).
136 See Adell Louise Amos, HydropowerReform and the Impact of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 on the Klamath Basin: Renewed Optimism or Same Old Song?, 22 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 1, 9-13 (2007).

137 See id. at 27-29 (describing the hearings for the Klamath project).
138

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING HYDROPOWER LICENSING PROCESSES,

GUIDELINES TO CONSIDER FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE ALTERNATIVE LICENSING PROCESS 1
(2000); OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, IDEAS FOR IMPLEMENTING
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before the formal FERC proceeding begins. 139 But even with those
innovations, the process can be contentious and long. FERC demands
that licensees begin preparing for relicensing at least five years before
the old license's expiration date, and many licensing processes take at
10
least that long. 4
These legal changes also have changed FERC's role. Once widely
perceived as an active promoter of the hydropower industry, FERC now
often occupies a role more akin to a judge facilitating a settlement in a
complex civil case.14 ' It rarely imposes its own vision on the proceedings,
1
and instead now occupies a largely reactive and facilitative role. 42
That complexity has contributed to another distinctive feature of the
FERC licensing process. FERC tends to make decisions one project at a
time. 143 The FPA doesn't mandate that approach; in fact, it specifically
states that FERC's should approve only projects that "will be best
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways ....144 With the consent of a license applicant,
FERC also will occasionally consolidate multiple licensing
proceedings. 45 But FERC has essentially rejected its planning mandate,
with the acquiescence of the courts, 146 and multi-project proceedings,

AND PARTICIPATING IN THE INTEGRATED LICENSING PROCESS (iLP) 5 (2011).
139 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT ON HYDROPOWER LICENSING

SETTLEMENTS cH2 (2006) ("b[T]e Commission looks with great favor on settlements in
licensing cases.").
140 Applications for New Licenses (Relicenses), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, http://
(last updated
www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-infoAicensing/app-new.asp
Sept. 5, 2014) ("At least 5 years before a license expires, the licensee must file a notice
of intent declaring whether or not it intends to seek a new license (relicense) for its
project.").
141 See generally Blumm & Nadol, supra note 123 (documenting the historical and
legal context of this shift).
142 We based this assertion on our own experience and on informal discussions with
experienced hydropower attorneys.
143 There are rare exceptions to this generalization. See infra note 234 and
accompanying text.
144 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2013). Some other agencies that participate in relicensing
processes also have planning mandates, and those plans could provide broader
frameworks for dam decisions. See, e.g., id. § 1533(f) (2013) (providing for endangered
species recovery plans).
145 See, e.g., Great Lakes Hydro Am., LLC, 102 FERC 61018, 61028 (2003)
(describing a consolidated proceeding).
146 See D.H. Cole, Reviving the Federal Power Act's Comprehensive Plan Requirement:
A History of Neglect and Prospectsfor the Future, 16 ENVTL. L. 639, 652-61 (1986).
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while not unheard of, are rare. 147 The usual consequence is project-by148
project decision-making.
2.

Federally Owned Dams

While the FERC regulatory process dominates the legal-academic
literature on dams, the federal government also owns dams, and those
dams are beyond FERC's jurisdiction. 149 Between them, seven federal
agencies own 171 hydroelectric dams. 50 Many of these dams are among
the nation's largest - collectively, they contain just over 50% of the
nation's hydroelectric capacity - and they have some of the farthestreaching environmental and non-environmental effects.151 They also are
subject to a very different legal regime.
The authorizing statute for each dam provides the primary legal
blueprint for its management, with subsequent water resource
development acts providing additional overlays. 152 Those blueprints can
be complex, often specifying multiple purposes for management of the
dam. 15 3 What they generally do not do, however, is create
administrative processes for reconsidering dam operations. Federally
owned dams therefore are not subject to a process like FERC
relicensing, and the leverage that the FPA supplies to other agencies and
to environmental advocates is missing. Similarly, CWA section 401,

147 As of November 25, 2013, a search of Westlaw's database of FERC decisions for
the term "consolidated licensing proceeding" produced eleven hits. Other decisions
may use different terms, and this number therefore probably understates the number of
consolidated proceedings, but it nevertheless indicates their rarity.
148 Many key FERC documents do not even mention the possibility of more

comprehensive proceedings. See, e.g.,

FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, HANDBOOK FOR

(2004)
(containing no mention of consolidated proceedings).
149 See 16 U.S.C. § 817 (2013) (requiring "any person, State, or municipality"
constructing a hydroelectric facility on navigable waterways to obtain a license, but not
extending that requirement to other federal agencies).
150 HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at 8. Two agencies - the Army Corps of Engineers
and the Bureau of Reclamation - own over three quarters of those dams. Id.
HYDROELECTRIC

151

PROJECT LICENSING AND 5 MW EXEMPTIONS FROM LICENSING

See id. at 2.

See Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1499, 1516-29 (2011) (summarizing the legal regime governing the Army Corps'
dams).
153 See, e.g., In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1167-78 (11th Cir.
2011) (describing the complex historical and legal saga of the Buford Dam).
152
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which supplies states with significant leverage over FERC-regulated
projects, does not apply.154
That does not mean federally owned dams are free of regulatory
constraint. In addition to authorizing legislation, other federal statutes,
like the ESA and NEPA, do still apply. 155 Indeed, ESA obligations provide
one of the primary legal levers that advocates can use to compel changes
in federal dam management, and on ongoing dispute on California's
Yuba River, where the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS")
recently attempted to compel a massive fish passage project, illustrates
the possibilities.156 Congress also has often authorized, if not clearly
obligated, changes designed to mitigate the adverse environmental
effects of federal water projects. 157 But the absence of a relicensing
process with a regulatory overseer creates a very different, and often
weaker, leverage structure than exists for FERC-regulated dams.
Because of these differences, environmental advocates and regulators
generally have less influence over federally owned dams than they do
over federally regulated dams. That disparity in influence also can
produce some interesting side effects. On some river systems, the first
dam anadromous fish encounter as they migrate upstream is a federally
owned dam, and upstream from that dam is a series of FERC-regulated
dams. 158 In that circumstance, the federally owned dam can serve as a
154 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2013) (extending coverage only to projects that receive "a
Federal license or permit").
155 These laws apply because they are triggered by discretionary federal actions and
altering dam operations, which dam managers must do from time to time, involves
discretion.
156

See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,

BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ENGLEBRIGHT
DAM AND RESERVOIR, DAGUERRE POINT DAM, AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES ON AND

AROUND ENGLEBRIGHT RESERVOIR 220 (2012) (demanding fish passage at two major dams

on California's Yuba River). The subsequent history of the dispute offers a cautionary
tale, however. The 2012 biological opinion was later withdrawn. See S. Yuba River
Citizens League v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 2:13-CV-00059-MCE, 2013 WL
4094777, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (describing the status of the biological
opinion and subsequent litigation). A replacement biological opinion published in 2014
is much narrower in its analytical scope and its proposed requirements. See NAT'L
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR
THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF DAGUERRE POINT DAM AND FISH LADDERS

11-26

(2014).
157 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2309a (2013) (providing that authorization).
158 For example, the lowermost dams in California's American River watershed the Nimbus and Folsom Dams - are operated by the Bureau of Reclamation. See Folsom
Dam, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Facility.jsp?facName=Folsom+Dam (last updated June 4, 2009); Nimbus Dam, U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Facility.jsp?facName=Nimbus+Dam (last
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partial regulatory shield, keeping protected fish populations, and the
legal obligations that come with them, from reaching the upstream dams.
3.

State-Regulated Dams

The legal literature on dams focuses overwhelmingly on those
regulated or, to a much lesser extent, owned by the federal government,
and in practice, those dams generate much of the controversy and
litigation. 159 There are obvious reasons for that focus; the largest and
most heavily regulated dams generally fall within these groups, and
advocates are sensible to focus their efforts where they can exert the
most leverage.t16 But over 97% of dams are neither owned by the federal
government nor regulated by FERC, and while their collective impacts
may not rise to the level of the federal behemoths, those impacts still
are significant.161 No synopsis of dam regulation would be complete,

therefore, without some discussion of state law.
Providing that discussion is difficult, however, because of two factors.
First, dam laws vary from state to state, as do the financial and
administrative resources that states devote to implementing their dam
laws. 162 Second, while a few studies summarize the dam laws of
individual states, no comprehensive state-by-state guide to the
environmental law of dams exists.

63

There are good and recent studies

of state dam safety laws and of the treatment of hydropower in state
renewable portfolio standards, but our discussion of the environmental

updated June 4, 2009). Those dams and their reservoirs prevent fish from migrating to
the upper parts of the American River watershed, which contains many non-federal
hydropower dams. See Upper American River Watershed, SACRAMENTO RIVER WATERSHED
PROGRAM,

httpJ/www.sacriver.org/aboutwatershed/roadmap/watersheds/american/upper-

american-river-watershed (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
159 See supra notes 113-57 and accompanying text. The sources cited here, though
there are many, are just the tip of the iceberg.
160 Not all hydroelectric dams are large. See HALL ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 ("[The
vast majority of hydroelectric plants are small or very small plants.").
161 See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
162 The contrast between Wisconsin, which funds a dam removal grant program and
Texas, where laws can make even finding information about a dam difficult, is one of
many possible examples of these differences. See Dam Removal Grant Program, Wis.
DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., http://dnr.wi.gov/Aid/DamRemoval.html (last modified Oct. 14,

2013); infra note 175 and accompanying text (describing Texas laws).
163 See, e.g.,JasonJ. Kelroy, Comment, Can We Get that Dam Thing out of Here?: An
Analysis of Potential Dam Removal Options in Wisconsin, 5 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1998)
(providing a thorough, and fairly exceptional, analysis of one state's dam laws).
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regulation of dams is based largely on a review of the dam laws of a
select set of states.

64

Despite these caveats, even a partial review of state dam laws supports
a few generalizations. The first is that state environmental regulation of
existing dams is generally quite lax.165 None of the states we reviewed
had a re-licensing requirement analogous to that created by the FPA. 166
Moreover, we identified few other procedural or substantive levers to
compel reconsideration of the impacts of existing dams. 167 Instead, in
most states, a dam, once built, is grandfathered from the requirements
of environmental laws.168 Many of those dams were constructed before

significant environmental laws existed or, at least, before those laws
were acknowledged and enforced.1 69 The environmental laws of many
states therefore have never really applied to most of those states'
dams. 170 Indeed, in many states, the only way environmental laws
would be triggered is if a dam owner proposes to do something different
with a dam - like, for example, add hydropower capacity or take the
171
dam out.

164 We focused on Georgia, Maine, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Wisconsin. We chose Georgia and Texas because they have large numbers of dams
(Texas has more than any other state) and high levels of aquatic biodiversity. Montana
and Oregon both have relatively abundant dams, significant hydropower capacity, and
significant fishery resources. Wisconsin and Pennsylvania both have reputations as
leaders in the field of dam removal. Finally, studies by The Nature Conservancy show
that Maine has very high potential as a focal area for dam removal projects, and, more
parochially, we live there.
165 See generally Georgia Safe Dams Act of 1978, GA. CODE.ANN. §§ 12-5-370 to 385 (2014) (exempting from the definition of dams those that were constructed or
financially assisted by federal agencies before November 1, 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, § 636 (2013) (requiring environmental review of new hydroelectric dams in
Maine, but not existing ones).
166 E.g., Kelroy, supra note 163, at 197 (discussing Wisconsin law).
167 See, e.g., id.at 192 (noting the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources'
limited authority to regulate already-built dams). A limited exception to this
generalization comes from Maine, where the commissioner of the Department of Marine
Resources may require fish passage for dams on waterways "frequented by... migratory
fish species." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 12760 (2013).
168 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 12-3-375 (2014) (requiring periodic "re-inventories"
of dams, but making no mention of environmental review).
169 See, e.g., Karrigan S. Bork et al., The Rebirth of CaliforniaFish & Game Code Section
5937: Waterfor Fish, 45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 809,817-44 (2012) (chronicling years of nonimplementation of California's fish passage law).
170 See generally Klein, supra note 11 (chronicling the rise of environmental law and
the decline of dam building).
171 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-377(a) (2014) ("It shall be unlawful for the owner
or operator of any dam for which a permit is required by this part to remove the dam
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On paper, state regulation of dam safety is more robust. Most states
have safety standards and laws requiring periodic inspection of dams,
and safety reviews ought to present opportunities to reexamine the
operations or even existence of dams.172 But on closer examination,
those schemes also often appear - in the words of one leading expert
- "pitiful."'173 Maine, for example, has robust requirements for dam
74
inspections but has never adequately funded the inspection program.'
Texas recently passed legislation exempting many dams from its
inspection program, and Texas law, at least as currently interpreted,
also limits the public's ability to even access information about dam
hazards.175Many other states face similar circumstances. 76 Dams do age
and fail, but because of these oversight gaps, smaller dam owners in
many states are all but legally invisible so long as nothing goes
drastically wrong. Indeed, there are thousands of state-regulated dams
t77
whose owners aren't even known.
Despite the prevalence of laissez-faire regimes, there are some
incentives for reducing the environmental and safety impacts of dams.
In most states, a dam owner faces tort liability if his dam fails, or if a
boater is injured by a deteriorating dam structure. 178 The United States
without the approval of the director."); Save Our Sebasticook, Inc. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,
928 A.2d 736, 740-41 (Me. 2007) (citing state law that limits dam owners' ability to
make flow changes).
172 For examples of safety standards, see ASS'N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS,
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DAM SAFETY (2000).
173 Naomi Schalit & John Christie, Maine's High-Hazard Dams Lack Inspection,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://bangordailynews.conV2011/08/24/news/
state/half-of-high-hazard-dams-lack-state-inspection (quoting University of Hawaii
civil engineering professor Peter Nicholson).
174 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 1113 (2013) (requiring inspections); Schalit &
Christie, supra note 173.
175 Mose Buchele, How Hundreds of 'Significant Hazard' Dams Escape State Inspection in
Texas, STATEIMPACT TEX. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/10/15/
how-hundreds-of-significant-hazard-dams-escape-state-inspection/; Mose Buchele, Want
to Learn About a Nearby Dam? In Texas, Some Questions Are Off Limits, STATEIMPACT TEX.
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/10/16/want-to-learn-about-anearby-dam-in-texas-some-questions-are-off-limits/.
176 See 2013 Report Cardfor America's Infrastructure:Dams: Conditions and Capacity,
AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/dams/
conditions-and-capacity (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
177 HEINZ CTR., supra note 68, at 31 (classifying the ownership status of 14.8% of the
dams in the Army Corps' database as "undetermined").
178 See Catherine C. Engberg, Note, The Dam Owner's Guide to Retirement Planning:
Assessing Owner Liability for Downstream Sediment Flow from Obsolete Dams, 21 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 177, 190-91 (2002). But some elements of tort law may inhibit dam
removals. See id. at 191-97. Owners also may not understand their responsibilities. Greg
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has a long tradition of passing laws designed to promote fish passage,
and while those laws were often observed largely in the breach, a few
court decisions have given them significant effect.179 And some states

have created legal mechanisms and offices devoted to helping dam
owners move through the removal process, or to allowing the state to
assume responsibility for abandoned dams. 180 But those programs are
rare unless one counts laws empowering government agencies to
dynamite beaver dams, 181 and state dam regulation on the whole
remains rather limited. Consequently, quite often the most procedurally
straightforward thing for a state-regulated dam owner to do with his
182
dam turns out to be nothing at all.

While state dam law does little to spur better environmental
management, it sometimes does encourage hydropower development.
States use an extraordinary variety of pricing mechanisms to incentivize
renewable energy, including renewable portfolio standards,18 3 net
metering programs, green power purchasing options, and property tax

Bruno, Local Aging Dams Need Repair, TIMES HERALD-RECORD

(May 14, 2007),

http://www.recordonline.com/article/20070514/News/705140319 (quoting the deputy
executive director of the American Society of Civil Engineers: "Most private owners
really don't have a very good understanding of the liability that they own .... ").
179 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 924-25
(E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation violated California Fish
and Game Code section 5936 by failing to release water to the San Joaquin River below
Friant Dam); Bork et al., supra note 169, at 860-83 (describing the Patterson litigation
and other California cases).
180 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 1130 (2013) (creating a fund to support,

among other things, "breaching of or removal of a dam"); Kelroy, supra note 163, at
200-04 (discussing Wisconsin law allowing removals of abandoned dams, but also
limits upon that authority).
181 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-224 (2013) (allowing the destruction of beaver
dams if they endanger public health). One might assume that beaver dam removals also
would bring fish passage benefits, but that assumption would be incorrect. Michael M.
Pollock et al., Hydrologic and Geomorphic Effects of Beaver Dams and Their Influence on
Fishes, 37 AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y SYMPOSIUM 213, 223 (2003) ("IT] he pond habitat formed
by beaver dams is highly beneficial to many fishes and ... species regularly cross dams
in both upstream and downstream directions.").
182 See, e.g., Eva Hershaw, Dams Are Coming Down, But Not in Texas, REPORTING TEX.
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://reportingtexas.com/dams-come-down-around-u-s-but-not-intexas/ ("State regulators have limited powers to force down a dam, and even if they
tried, the process is extraordinarily bureaucratic.").
183 A renewable portfolio standard requires a state's energy suppliers to purchase or
generate a percentage of their energy from renewable sources.
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rebates.' 84 Some of these programs include hydropower. 8 5 Typically,
state programs are limited to small hydropower sources, and
environmental criteria sometimes apply. 8 6 Many dams, including larger
hydropower systems, therefore are likely to be excluded from these
programs, no matter how much the dam owners do to mitigate their
facilities' adverse environmental effects. 187 Conversely, and perversely,
in some states a small hydropower facility is eligible for favorable
pricing even if its environmental impacts are drastic. t 88 But a variety of
programs does create incentives for constructing new hydropower
systems. 189

Nevertheless, state dam law on the whole generally provides only
weak incentives to take proactive steps with dams. Aside from pricing
incentives in a subset of states (and applicable to a subset of dams),
states do little to encourage dam owners to upgrade their systems.
Similarly, they do little to penalize owners whose dams produce adverse
environmental consequences or even safety threats. And state programs
to encourage comprehensive reassessment of dam systems are nearly
unheard of.1 90
II.

THE PENOBSCOT PROJECT

While the United States' dam laws may entrench the status quo, dam
policy does retain moments of dynamism. In the past century, over one

184 For a thorough compilation of information on state renewable energy incentives,

see DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
185 See ASHLEY JOHNSON, NAT'L HYDROPOWER Assoc., STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD REPORT: SPRING 2011 UPDATE 4

(2011), available at http://www.hydro.org/wp-

content/uploads/201 1/10/State-RPS-standards-updated-August-2011 .pdf.
186 See generally id. (summarizing state programs and regulations, regarding
hydropower projects).
187 See KSE Focus, States Debate Large-Scale Hydro Power and Renewable Portfolio
Standards, CONGRESS.ORG (Aug. 7, 2013), http://congress.org/2013/08/07/states-debatelarge-scale-hydro-power-and-renewable-portfolio-standards.
188 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 185, at 32-33 (describing Minnesota's size-based
thresholds); Memorandum from David Beaujon to the Members of the Water Res.
Review Comm. 2 (Oct. 7, 2013) (on file with Colorado Legislative Council Staff)
(describing the purely size-based criteria for including hydroelectric power in
Colorado's RPS).
189 See generally DSIRE, supra note 184 (summarizing state programs).
190 The primary exception to this generalization is a statute known as the Maine
Rivers Policy. See Leandro E. Miranda, A Review of Guidanceand Criteriafor Managing
Reservoirs and Associated Riverine Environments to Benefit Fish and Fisheries, in DAMS,
FISH AND FISHERIES: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION,

93, at 91, 120 (describing the Maine Rivers Policy).
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thousand of the United States' dams have come out,191 and the

possibility of adding additional hydropower capacity has generated a
flurry of studies. 192 But both trends are limited and largely piecemeal,
and the trends also are almost entirely disconnected from each other.
Efforts to prioritize environmental and energy improvement projects
throughout entire river basins are generally absent from American dam
policy. 193 That is problematic, and the Penobscot River Restoration
Project, which this section describes in depth, illustrates the potential
benefits of an alternative approach.
The Penobscot River arises in a lightly developed region of
northeastern Maine. 194 Forests, lakes, wetlands, and tributary streams fill
the watershed, and the river discharges into what once were some of the
richest fishing grounds in the world. 195 In its natural state, the river
supported remarkable populations of fish, many of which migrated
between fresh and saltwater to reproduce. 196 But as the United States
industrialized, the timber industry began using the waterway for log
drives, 197 and factories, mills, and municipal wastewater systems used the
river as a conduit for their wastes. 198 With industrialization came dams,
and as of 2011, 107 dams were distributed throughout the watershed. 199
The effect on the river's fisheries was predictable and dramatic. 200 The
log drives are long gone, and the CWA improved water quality, but fish

191 Questions About Removing Dams, supra note 101.
192 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
193 See Michael J. Kuby et al., A Multiobjective Optimization Model for Dam Removal:
An Example Trading off Salmon Passage with Hydropower and Water Storage in the
Willamette Basin, 28 ADVANCES WATER RESOURCES 845, 853 (2005) ("Currently, dam
removal is considered mainly on a dam-by-dam basis.").
194 For maps of the watershed and the project area, see Penobscot River Restoration
Project, PENOBSCOT RIVER RESTORATION TRUST, http://www.penobscotriver.org/content/
4020/maps (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
195 See ANDREWJ. PERSHING ET AL., THE FUTURE OF COD IN THE GULF OF MAINE 1-3

(2013); Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81
MINN. L. REV. 869, 946-47 (1997) (describing the demise of northeastern fisheries);
Opperman et al., supra note 5.
196 See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
197 In New England, the preferred way to deliver logs to mills was to float them
downriver. See Penobscot Watersheds, ME. RIVERS, http://mainerivers.org/watershedprofiles/penobscot-watershed/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
198 See Laura Rose Day, Restoring Native Fisheries to Maine's Largest Watershed: The
Penobscot River Restoration Project, 134J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUc. 29, 29 (2006);
Opperman et al., supra note 5.
199 Compared to other northeastern watersheds, this density of dams is quite low.
MARTIN & APSE, NORTHWEST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47, at 61-62.
200 See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
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populations remain a small fraction of their historic levels. 201 The
Atlantic salmon run, which once topped 100,000 fish, now averages
approximately 2,000 fish per year. 20 2 A 2004 National Research Council
study explained why: "the greatest impediment to the increase of
salmon populations in Maine is the obstruction of their passage up and
20 3
down streams and degradation of their habitat caused by dams."
American shad, which once were the most commercially valuable
species in the river, and were much more abundant than salmon, are
nearly gone. 204 Along with Atlantic salmon, shortnose sturgeon are now
endangered, and the20 5NMFS lists alewife and blueback herring as
"species of concern."
Those ecological changes brought unfortunate
the Penobscot Indian Tribe, which viewed
For
human consequences.
the river as "a sacred, living entity that is central to the Tribe's cultural
identity," the degradation was devastating. 20 6 Fishing was integral to the
tribe's connection to the river, but the tribe hasn't been able to exercise
its fishing rights for more than a century. 20 7 Non-native fishermen also
have suffered. Recent fisheries research strongly suggests that
diadromous fish population declines contributed to the poor condition
of the Gulf of Maine's ocean fisheries, and that poor condition, and the

201 See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, ATLANTIC SALMON IN MAINE 8 (2004) ("[Dams... have

an enormous amount of habitat unavailable to Maine salmon and have affected
of the habitat that is still available.").
Opperman et al., supra note 5.
NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 201, at 11.
See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
Tara R. Trinko Lake et al., Evaluating Changes in DiadromousSpecies Distributions
and Habitat Accessibility Following the Penobscot River Restoration Project, 4 MARINE &
made
much
202
203
204
205

COASTAL FISHERIES: DYNAMICS, MGMT., & ECOSYSTEM SCI. 284, 285 (2012).
206 Opperman et al., supra note 5; see also Gail Courey Toensing, $25 Million Raised

to Begin Ambitious Penobscot River Restoration Project, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 11,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2008/02/11/25-million-raised2008),
Toensing quotes John
begin-ambitious-penobscot-river-restoration-project-92202.
Banks, director of the Penobscot Nation's Department of Natural Resources:
You often hear people talk about we are the river, the river is us. It defines us
as a tribe, it defines who we are, where we came from, and many of our
cultural traditions are tied to the river and its resources. We've evolved as a
riverine tribe for 10,000 years here. The river has provide[d] all of our needs
- physically, culturally, spiritually and allowed us to prosper for thousands
of years.
Id.
207 See Toensing, supra note 206.
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turmoil it created, have led NMFS to classify the New England fishery
208
as an "economic disaster."
That combination of cultural and environmental loss, on the one
hand, and recovery potential on the other made the Penobscot a target
for restoration efforts.209 A somewhat unique ownership situation
heightened the potential. In many river basins, dam ownership is
fragmented, and that fragmentation creates challenges for anyone
interested in developing a coordinated management scheme. 21 0 In the
lower reaches of the Penobscot watershed, however, a more
consolidated ownership pattern existed.
In 1999, PPL Corporation purchased all of the dams in the lower
Penobscot basin, consolidating ownership within a single corporate
entity. 2 11 Several of those dams' license renewals already were in
dispute, with strong opposition from environmental groups and the
Penobscot Indian Tribe, and PPL was willing to expand settlement
discussions to encompass other dams that were not presently under
review. 2 12 For environmental groups and the Penobscot Indian Tribe,
these dam relicensing processes presented an important opportunity.
Recent changes on other rivers provided some basis for optimism. A
few years earlier, environmental regulators and advocacy organizations
had used the relicensing process for the Edwards Dam, on the nearby
Kennebec River, as an opportunity to advocate for improved
fishways. 213 The end result was a nationally celebrated dam removal

208 See DisasterDeclarationIssued for NE Groundfish Industry, SAVING SEAFOOD (Sept.
13, 2012), http://www.savingseafood.org/washington/disaster-declaration-issued-forne-groundfish-industry-2.html; Kevin Miller, New England Fishery DisasterBill Sent to
Senate, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (July 19, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/
2013/07/19/fishery-disaster-bill-sent-to-senate_2013-07-19. See generally Edward P.
Ames & John Lichter, Gadids and Alewives: Structure Within Complexity in the Gulf of
Maine, 141 FISHERIES RES. 70, 75-78 (2013) ("1lf diadromous species recover, local
gadids may re-establish their metapopulation structures in northeastern New
England.").
209 See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 201, at 12 ("Since most Maine salmon
are now in the Penobscot River, that population should be a primary focus for
rehabilitating the species in Maine ....A program of dam removal should be started.").
210 See HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at 3 (showing dam ownership patterns).
211 See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
212 See id.
213 See Crane, supra note 130, at 135-43. For a comparison of the Edwards Dam
removal to that of the Penobscot River, see John Holyoke, Edwards Dam Success
Foreshadows Penobscot River Project's Future, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2012),
http ://bangordailynews. con2012/06/08/outdoors/edwards-dam-success-foreshadowspenobscot-river-projects-future/.
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project. 214 Similar initiatives were underway at some major west coast
dams, including the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams, which had nearly
exterminated salmon runs in one of the rivers draining Olympic
National Park.215 But the Penobscot relicensing processes offered an
opportunity for a more systemic approach. Rather than considering
each dam separately, the participants in the Penobscot project decided
to concurrently evaluate the status of all of PPL's dams in the lower
Penobscot basin. 2t 6 That concurrent evaluation would afford them an
the river's
opportunity to identify cost-effective ways to rehabilitate
2 17
fisheries while retaining much of its hydropower.
In 2004, the participants ultimately were able to strike a deal. 218 For

between twenty-four and twenty-six million dollars (the actual price
would depend on the timing of the purchase), the environmental
partners would purchase three dams. 219 Two would be removed. 220 The
third would remain in place (upstream landowners were deeply
attached to the flatwater impoundment it created) but it would be
decommissioned and an innovative fish bypass facility would be
installed. 221 Another upstream dam also would receive an additional fish
bypass facility. 222 In return for these environmental benefits, the

environmental coalition agreed to withhold opposition to the renewal
of hydropower licenses at six remaining dams. Those dams would either

214 See Crane, supra note 130, at 142-46; see also The 1Oth Anniversary of the Removal
of Maine's Edwards Dam, AM. RIvERS, http://www.americanrivers.org/initiative/dams/
(last
projects/the- 10th-anniversary-of-the-removal-of-mainea%C2%89uas-edwards-dam
visited on Oct. 9, 2014).
215 See Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38, at 1050-54.
216 See Opperman et al., supra note 5 (describing the process).
217

See id.

Submittal of the Lower Penobscot River Basin Comprehensive Settlement Agreement
with Explanatory Statement at 1-4, PPL Me., LLC, 111 FERC 62,062 (2004) (No. D197-10),
available at http://www.penobscotriver.org/assets/LowerPenobscotAgreement -FERC_
June 25 04 reduced size.pdf.
219 Opperman et al., supra note 5. ("Under the agreement, PPL granted a five-year
option to purchase three dams ... to the newly created not-for-profit Penobscot River
Restoration Trust ] for between US$24 million and US$26 million."). They completed
the purchase in 2008, using $25 million raised from a combination of public and private
sources. Press Release, Penobscot River Restoration Trust, Fisheries Restoration, Energy
Balance Closer to Becoming Reality on Penobscot River (Aug. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.penobscotriver.org/assets/FINALPenobscotAug-21 Event-pr.pdf.
220 See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
218

221
222

See id.
See id.
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continue to produce hydropower at their current rate or would receive
223
hydropower upgrades.
The resulting environmental changes should be dramatic. While the
exact amounts are difficult to calculate, scientists anticipate that
thousands of kilometers of river and stream habitat will become more
accessible to the stronger swimmers (like salmon and shad) in the river
system.

22 4

For species that cannot negotiate fish ladders and rapids,

fewer additional river miles will become available, but the percentage
increase in habitat will actually be much larger. 225
Numbers of increased fish are even more uncertain, but The Nature
Conservancy's preliminary estimates suggest that dramatic changes are
likely. 226 The potential changes also extend beyond improved fisheries.
The removal of the Edwards Dam improved water quality, revitalized
property values, and renewed community interest in the riverfront.227
Towns along the Penobscot already are anticipating, and planning for,
similar changes. 228
On their own, those benefits would establish the Penobscot Project
as one of the nation's most ambitious environmental restoration
projects. But what sets the Penobscot Project apart is its impact, or lack
thereof, on hydropower generating capacity. 229 Had this been a simple
dam removal project, approximately 100 megawatts of generating
power would have come out. 230 That capacity might have been made up

through fossil fuel combustion or some other environmentally
damaging source. But by moving turbines from one of the
decommissioned dams to one of the remaining dams, and by making
several other adjustments, the dam owners will avoid any significant

223
224

See id.
See id.

See Trinko Lake et al., supra note 205, at 288.
See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
227 See Lynne Y. Lewis et al., Dams, Dam Removal and River Restoration: A Hedonic
Property Value Analysis, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. PO-'Y 175, 185 (2008) (documenting rising
property values after the Edwards Dam removal); see also Recreational and Economic
Benefits of Edwards Dam Removal, ME. RIVERS, http://mainerivers.org/wp-content/
uploads/2010/09/Edwards-Dam-Benefits-NRCM.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
228 Fact Sheet, PENOBSCOT RIVER RESTORATION TRUST, http://www.penobscotriver.org/
assets/FactSheetOct17_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
229 See Opperman et al., supra note 5.
230 See id. (showing the power capacity of the removed dams).
225

226
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reduction in hydropower generation. 231 In fact, recent calculations have
232
found that generating capacity has slightly increased.
What happened in the Penobscot Basin is not entirely unique. FERC
has a long history of ordering off-site mitigation to compensate for the
impacts of new hydropower projects, and in some ways, the Penobscot
project just represents a more sophisticated and ambitious application
of that concept. 233 On a few other river basins, FERC also has
2 34
considered multiple hydropower facilities in a single proceeding.
Indeed, a major multi-dam proceeding might be nearing a resolution for
the Klamath River, which for over a decade has been one of the nation's
most prominent water conflicts. 2 35 In the wake of the Penobscot project,

the federal government also has actively searched for other watersheds
where basin-scale analyses might generate more effective systems of
watershed management. 236 Several agencies are currently pursuing a
pilot project on the Deschutes River in Oregon and beginning studies
on the Connecticut and Roanoke River basins. 23 7 Finally, ambitious
basin-scale sustainable hydropower projects are underway on major
river systems in Africa and Central and South America. 238 Nevertheless,
231 Id. ("Although generation will be maintained or slightly increased from the
Penobscot, greater hydropower generation would have been possible through
operational changes or capacity or efficiency upgrades at all of the dams.").
232 Id.
233 See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 132 FERC (1 62,261 (2010) (discussing FERC's
policies on off-site mitigation, though disapproving it in the matter at hand). Dam
removals have rarely been part of that mitigation, but FERC has approved that
approach. See, e.g., Bangor-Pac. Hydro Assocs., 47 FERC ( 61,165 (1989) (approving
Bangor-Pacific Hydro Associates' application to amend its project license in exchange
for alternative off-site mitigation measures).
234 See, e.g., Erie Boulevard Hydropower, LP, 98 FERC 61,145 (2002) (discussing
a proceeding and settlement involving four projects on the Raquette River in New York);
Joe DosSantos & Tim Swant, Collaborationor Confrontation?Take Your Pick: Clark Fork
Projects Hydro Relicensing, CLARK FORK SYMPOSIUM, http://cas.umt.edu/clarkfork/
Abstracts/presenters/DosSantospaper.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) (describing a
relicensing process involving two major dams).
235 See generally CHARLES V. STERN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42158, KLAMATH
BASIN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS (2014) (describing recent agreements and developments
in the Klamath conflict).
236 See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 40, at 2 (committing federal agencies to
this search).
237 See G.E. JOHNSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE INTEGRATED BASIN-SCALE

OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENT INITIATIVE: PHASE 1 METHODOLOGY AND PRELIMINARY SCOPING
ASSESSMENTS FOR THE CONNECTICUT AND ROANOKE RIVER BASINS (2013); Geerlofs et al.,

supra note 40.
238 See Email from Jeffrey Opperman, Lead Scientist, Great Rivers P'ship, The Nature
Conservancy, to Dave Owen, Professor of Law, Univ. of Me. Law Sch. (Nov. 13, 2014,
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the Penobscot remains a gold standard. To date, no river-basin project
has done quite as effective a job of translating systemic planning into
action, or at combining sustained hydropower production with
potentially huge improvements in environmental quality.
IlI.

DAMS AND THE FRONTIERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRADING

To us, and to many observers, the Penobscot Project seems worthy of
imitation. 239 The opportunity for imitation also exists, at least as a
matter of ecology and engineering. 240 The key questions, then, are what
legal and economic conditions would facilitate such replication;
whether those conditions are present for dams; and, if they are not
present, what reforms, if any, could remedy their absence.
Our answers to these questions turn on a key premise. While the
Penobscot is a distinctive project, its tradeoff between environmental
improvements in some locations and hydropower upgrades in others
reflects an increasingly familiar approach to environmental protection.
On a small scale, the Penobscot project created an environmental
trading system. And while almost nothing has been written about
applying trading system concepts to dams, the Penobscot project
illustrates the possibilities. 241 Our premise, then, is that the lessons from
several decades of environmental trading can help us assess whether
trading dams will be viable, and about what reforms might increase that
viability. We therefore begin this section with a background discussion
of environmental trading systems, from which we extract general
lessons for dam trading, and we then focus on specific metrics of
potential failure or success.
Before launching into that discussion, however, we offer a few words
about what we mean by trading dams. The concept could apply in
several different scenarios. In the simplest, a dam owner might obtain
authorization to build, or continue operating, a dam in one location in
return for removing a dam somewhere else. 24 2 Somewhat more
11:54 EST) (on file with author).
239 In making this statement, we are not arguing that every dam removal project
should be accompanied by an offsetting increase in hydropower capacity. Sometimes
the lost hydropower capacity will be a very small price to pay for the associated
environmental improvements.
240 See, e.g., Kuby et al., supra note 193, at 851 (concluding selective dam removal
"could reconnect most of the drainage area of the Willamette River to the Pacific Ocean
with little loss of hydropower and/or storage capacity").
241 We have found one article that contemplates this possibility. See Workman, supra
note 31, at 40.
242 For a somewhat analogous example, see Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 84 FERC 'I
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ambitiously, the trades could involve larger numbers of dams, with
sustained or increased dam operations in a larger set of locations traded
for a larger set of coordinated removal projects.

243

The Penobscot

model. 244

Alternatively, the trades might
Project exemplifies that latter
involve using dam removals to mitigate environmentally damaging
activities, like wetlands filling or other forms of habitat destruction, that
don't involve dams. 245 Finally, and most ambitiously, dam removals

might be integrated into watershed-scale, multi-activity trading
programs, in which a broad suite of environmental restoration activities,
including dam removal, offsets a broad range of economic activities,
246
including but not limited to dam operations.

61,227 (1998). That decision approved a settlement agreement whereby upstream dam
owners obtained delays in the imposition of fish passage requirements by contributing
funding to support the Edwards Dam's removal. Id. at 162,091.
243 For any such program, defining the geographic scale of the trading area will be a
challenge, and the choice will likely depend upon the environmental goals driving the
trading system.
244 See supra notes 209-32 and accompanying text.
245 The Edwards Dam settlement also provides an example: Bath Ironworks
contributed $2.5 million to the dam removal and in return obtained the ability to fill
fifteen acres of wetlands. See Pete Didisheim, Dam Removal Foe Misinformed, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, July 12, 1999, at A7 (explaining the deal).
246 See BECCA MADSEN ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY
MARKETS: OFFSET AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE

21 (2010) (describing pilot

trading programs in the Willamette River and Chesapeake Bay basins).
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Figure 1. A Simple Interbasin Trade
In returnfor constructingnew Dam E on the river basin at the left, the constructioncompany
agrees to remove dam D, which previously blocked the river basin at right. Because the new
dam E will be located above two other dams (which we assume,for purposes of illustration,
already block fish passage), its environmental harm will be more than balanced by the gain
from opening up river system 2.

Before: Dams A, B, C, and D block fish passage on both rivers.

After: New Dam E has gone in, but old dam D has been removed, opening one
whole river system to fish.
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Figure 2. Trading Dam Removals for Other Activities
In returnfor obtaining authorizationto fill a wetland area,the factory owners agree to fund
the removal of an upstream dam. If the value of increased river connectivity is greater than
the damage done by the wetland fill, then the trade should lead to improved environmental
and economic outcomes.

/

Before: The dam blocks the river, and the factory owners want to expand into
the wetland area.

FM-A1

After: The wetlands have been filled, and in return the factory owners fund
dam removal.

I
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We also envision dam trading achieving a variety of goals. In a basin
where improved environmental conditions are the primary goal,
selective trading could help minimize the energy loss associated with

achieving that goal; dam owners could obtain the right to continue
operating in more economically desirable locations by agreeing to
remove less economically valuable dams. 247 Conversely, in places where
government policy demands increases in hydropower capacity, dam
trading could help planners achieve their energy capacity goals, or at
least most of them, while minimizing negative environmental side
effects.248 In a place where increased renewable energy generation and
improved environmental quality both are important public policy goals,
trading could help reconcile these two otherwise conflicting priorities.
In short, endorsing the possibility of a trading regime does not imply an
associated endorsement of a particular balance between hydropower
generation and environmental protection.
A.

The Evolution of Environmental Trading Systems

The reforms we advocate for dams can trace their intellectual roots to
smokestacks and swamps. 249 Beginning in the early 1970s, regulators
emphasized uniform standards for all analogous sources of pollution. 250
But critics noted that uniform standards might be inefficient if, as is often
the case, compliance costs differ from source to source.251 If regulators
instead established overall caps on levels of pollution, gave (or auctioned)
regulated firms entitlements to pollute up to that cap, and allowed those
regulated firms to trade their entitlements, the same environmental
outcomes might be achieved with greater economic efficiency. 252 Firms
247 The Bonneville Power Administration, which runs hydropower dams throughout
the Columbia River Basin, maintains an environmental mitigation fund designed to
serve this general purpose. See Dam Removal on Snake River Tributary: Dutch Flat Dam,
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. (Nov. 8, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.bpa.gov/
news/newsroom/Pages/Dam-removal-on-Snake-River-tributary-Dutch-Flat-Dam.aspx
(describing a specific dam removal and the larger program).
248 See E-mail from Jeffrey Opperman to Dave Owen, supra note 238 (describing
several countries in which The Nature Conservancy is working on this challenge).
249 For discussion of this early history, see TOM TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN
EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 9-11 (1985).
250 See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Erafrom an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1-3 (1991).
251 See id. at 6 (asserting that "[ulniform emission standards ...
tend to lead to
inefficient outcomes" because "the costs of controlling pollutant emissions vary greatly
among and even within firms").
252 See Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and Administrative
Discretion, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 171, 178-79 (Richard 1.Lazarus & Oliver A.
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that could abate pollution more cheaply could reduce their emissions
more than they otherwise would have been required to, and then could
sell the "credits" created by the excess reductions to firms for which
pollution abatement would be more costly. 253 Compliance burdens, in

other words, would be allocated through trading to those firms that could
shoulder those costs most cheaply.
In a relatively short time, this idea metamorphosed from a fringe
254
critique into one of environmental law's central policy innovations.
Regulators tested this concept at individual facilities, allowing increases
25
in pollution at one smokestack to be offset by reductions at another. They soon expanded the concept to allow trading among different and
separately owned facilities.256 They also allowed "banking," which
means allowing regulated entities to trade excess reductions of
pollution in the short term for more generous allowances in the
future. 257 Trading initially was quite controversial; in addition to
concerns about its efficacy, many environmentalists worried that
trading systems implied a normative endorsement of pollution, or the
creation of "rights" to pollute. 258 But air quality trading programs
29
became increasingly prevalent, and they also appeared to succeed. 5
Trading programs have now become deeply entrenched, and broadly
supported, in the field of air quality regulation, and new regulatory
programs for greenhouse gas emissions often place central reliance
upon this approach. 260 They also have generated some of environmental
law's most enduring academic debates.

Houck eds., 2005).
253

Id.

See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 250, at 3 (arguing that policymakers had "largely
ignored" economists' calls for incentive-based regulatory systems).
255 See Freeman, supra note 252, at 178-84 (describing the evolution of this "bubble"
concept).
256 See id. at 173 (describing the "bubble" concept's metamorphosis into modern
cap-and-trade programs).
257 See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory
and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 368 (1989).
258 Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The S0 2 Allowance Trading System:
The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 103 (2013)
(describing that hostility).
259 See id. at 104 (arguing that the acid rain program succeeded, albeit in unexpected
ways); see also Goulder, supra note 33, at 100.
260 See Richard G. Newell et al., Carbon Markets 15 Years After Kyoto: Lessons
Learned, New Challenges, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 123, 123-24 (2013) (describing the
international proliferation of carbon trading schemes).
254
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Meanwhile, habitat protection programs were evolving along a
similar trajectory. 26 1 Offsetting, or "mitigating," habitat degradation at
one place or time with environmental improvements elsewhere had a
long history in environmental regulation. With dams, for example,
mitigation had been widely (and often disastrously) used for decades,
and dam builders often attempted to mitigate their dams' impacts by
constructing fish ladders and hatcheries. 262 But use of this approach
accelerated with the emergence of CWA Section 404, which prohibits
unpermitted dredging and filling of wetlands and waterways. 263
The national wetlands policy implemented under section 404 is
somewhat like a cap-and-trade scheme. The cap is a national policy
against net loss of wetlands. 264 Pursuant to that policy, the Army Corps
of Engineers, which holds primary responsibility for implementing
section 404, generally requires permit applicants to avoid wetlands
entirely, if possible, and to minimize any impacts that cannot be
avoided. 265 For many development projects, however, some impact
remains unavoidable, and stopping all of those projects has never been
a politically tenable option. The Army Corps instead has turned to
compensatory mitigation. 266 Sometimes that compensatory mitigation
occurs through the permittee itself constructing or restoring a substitute
wetland, and sometimes it occurs through the payment of fees (referred
to as in-lieu fees) that support some other entity's wetland restoration
work. 267 In other circumstances, private wetlands mitigation "banks"
create or restore wetlands and then sell credits to future developers. 268

261 See generally Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24
(describing habitat trading, with a particular focus on wetlands).
262 See generally LICHATOWICH, supra note 91 (describing decades of failed salmon
management).
263 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2013).
264 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of
Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29-35 (2011)
(describing the evolution and implementation of the "no-net-loss" policy).
265 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY MITIGATION (2008),
available at http://water.epa.govAawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2003 05_30 wetlands
_CMitigation.pdf.
266 See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT 64-67 (2001).
267 See generally ENVTL. LAW INST., THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF IN-LIEU FEE
MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (describing how in-lieu fee programs function,
as well as common problems that arise with those programs).
268 See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking,
and Takings, 81 IOwA L. REV. 527, 540, 551 (1993) (describing the emergency of
wetlands mitigation banking).
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In a relatively short time, wetlands mitigation has become a billion269
dollar industry.
While air quality and wetlands are the two most prominent examples
of environmental trading systems, variations on trading concepts now
pervade environmental law. 270 Off-site mitigation, often involving

banking, is now central to the habitat conservation planning process
under section ten of the ESA.271 Transferable fishing quotas have become
increasingly popular. 27 2 Advocates have argued that trading systems can
273
bring conservation into otherwise wasteful systems of water rights.
Many municipal governments attempt to use tradable development
rights to direct urban growth toward preferred locations. 274 Though the
trading systems vary considerably, the common foundation of nearly all
of these systems is a belief that allowing regulated entities to trade
increased environmental degradation in some locations for increased
protection in others can be a more efficient and less intrusive way to
27
conduct environmental regulation. 5
Despite some successes, actual results have not always lived up to that
theoretical promise. Wetlands mitigation provides one prominent
example: for years, plenty of trading occurred, but the constructed or
restored wetlands often offered poor compensation for the wetlands that
had been lost. 276 In other contexts, programs have failed to get started.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has been
promoting water quality trading systems for years, but the few programs
that even exist have generated very low volumes of trading.277 In others,
269 See MADSEN ET AL., supra note 246, at iv (describing wetlands mitigation in the
United States).
270 See Tietenberg, supra note 25, at 63 (describing many applications).
271 See Salzman & Ruhl, Currenciesand Commodification, supra note 24, at 648-49 &
n.102.
272 Cindy Chu, Thirty Years Later: The Global Growth of ITQs and Their Influence on
Stock Status in MarineFisheries, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 217, 217 (2009).
273 See, e.g., Thomas Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water Policy: Markets
andRegulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 165, 166 (1998) (arguing that water markets
could play an important part in reforming water use).
274 See MARGARET WALLS & VIRGINIA MCCONNELL, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
IN U.S. COMMUNITIES: EVALUATING PROGRAM DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND OUTCOMES 8
(2007).
275 See generally Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supranote 30,
at 1365 n.13 (arguing, for these reasons and others, that market-based regulation is
superior to alternative approaches).
276 See Todd BenDor & Nicholas Brozovi , Determinants of Spatial and Temporal
Patterns in Compensatory Wetland Mitigation, 40 ENVTL. MGMT. 349, 351 (2007)
(summarizing critiques of traditional wetland mitigation).
277 See Fisher-Vanden & Olmstead, supra note 32, at 147.
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a lack of post-trade monitoring makes the program difficult to
evaluate. 278 And even with the programs most commonly hailed as
successes, debate continues about the extent of their success, and the
279
reasons for it.
Trading also continues to generate more theoretical and normative
critiques. One key objection is that trading programs far too often
involve trading things that are incommensurate, with environmental
protection typically on the losing end of the deal.280 More broadly, some
critics still argue that trading entrenches a market-oriented worldview,
in which environmental ethics are subordinated to utilitarian
28
calculations of profit. 1
Those critiques have force, but the history of trading systems offers a
third key lesson: the world of environmental trading systems is not
rigidly divided between successes and failures. Trading systems can
improve, and perhaps the best example of this improvement is the
wetlands mitigation system. Originally, EPA and the Army Corps of
Engineers favored compensation through construction of on-site
wetlands. 282 But the new wetlands often failed, in large part because
their geographic isolation; a constructed wetland surrounded by
shopping mall parking is unlikely to thrive. 28 3 In response to those
failures, the Corps has moved toward systems that aggregate
compensatory mitigation funds into larger accounts and use those funds

278 See, e.g., Jessica Fox & Anamaria Nino-Murcia, Status of Species Conservation

Banking in the United States, 19

CONSERVATION BIOLOGY

996, 997 (2005) ("Government-

initiated Web sites maintaining conservation bank data are out of date, incomplete, and
not useful for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the practice."); Rebecca Lave
et al,, Why You Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation Banking, 26 ECOLOGICAL
RESTORATION 287, 288 (2008) (arguing that the question "does aquatic ecosystem
restoration actually work?" has received "relatively little documentation").
279 See, e.g., Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 258 (arguing that the S02 trading
system performed in unexpected ways and succeeded for unexpected reasons).
280 The most thorough development of this critique comes from Salzman and Ruhl,
Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24, at 633-34.
281 See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27,
35-37 (1996) (critiquing water rights trading).
282 See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the
Environmental ProtectionAgency: The Determinationof Mitigation Under the Clean Water
Act Section 4(b)(1) Guidelines, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/
guidance/wetlands/mitigate.cfm (last updated Mar. 6, 2012) (emphasizing on-site, inkind mitigation).
283 See ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW,
POLICY, AND POLITICS 105-09 (2011) (describing these and other reasons for the failures
of permittee-responsible mitigation).
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to restore and protect higher-value wetlands. 28 4 Mitigation experts
generally agree that this approach holds more promise. 285 That is just
one change, of course, but the wetlands program also offers other
examples, 286 and in many other contexts, trading programs can improve
287
as participants learn from experience.
For dams, then, the still-unfolding story of environmental trading
systems offers economic promise, warning, and the possibility of
learning. The promise remains the theoretical flexibility and cost
savings associated with trading systems, as well as their track record of
success in some circumstances. 288 The warning stems from their
struggles and, sometimes, failures in other realms. Trading systems are
useful tools, but not for every problem, and not unless they are designed
and implemented with care. 289And the possibility of learning should
provide some reassurance that dam trading, even if initially tentative,
limited, and sometimes unsuccessful, can evolve - if the first
experiments begin.
B. Metrics of Success
Beyond these general lessons, the history of environmental trading
systems provides several metrics by which to evaluate their potential
utility for dams. In our view, three categories of metrics are particularly
important. The first is the presence of legal authorization for trading
systems. Without such authorization, trading is simply not possible. The
second is the presence of sufficient incentives, both legal and economic
(the two are highly intertwined), for the relevant actors to engage in
trading. Third, to function effectively, most trading systems require
abundant information, both about the things to be traded and the
environmental and social consequences of those trades. Absent that

284

See 33 C.F.R. § 332.3 (2014) (establishing preferences for mitigation banking,

in-lieu fee programs, and watershed approaches over on-site, permittee-responsible
mitigation).
285

See

WILKINSON ET AL.,

supra note 41, at 30-31 (describing the Corps' movement

toward a "watershed" approach).
286 The development of new pricing systems, like in-lieu fees, and of both private
and public expertise are also important examples.
287 See generally MADSEN ET AL., supra note 246, at 19 (noting that developing
transparency systems has been an important innovation); WILKINSON ET AL., supra note
41, at 30-31 (describing the recent and potential future evolution of habitat trading
systems); Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 267-73 (describing how
technological advances can improve trading systems).
288 See Goulder, supra note 33, at 91.
289 See id. at 94 (emphasizing the importance of context-appropriate design).
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information, trading systems are likely to be economically or
environmentally dysfunctional. Below, we explain and apply each of
these metrics.
1. Authorization
Perhaps the clearest bar to an environmental trading system is the
absence of legal authorization to engage in trading. Almost any trading
system will be implemented by government agencies, and those
agencies only can use the regulatory tools given unto them by law. That
might seem like a rather obvious point, but it remains an important one;
in recent years, EPA has lost court cases because judges were convinced
that the agency's trading systems were contrary to governing statutes. 290
For dams, which are often embedded in complex legal webs
constructed without any thought of trading, this lesson might seem
daunting. Nevertheless, there are few general prohibitions to trading in
those laws. Instead, many existing provisions and established practices
could provide foundations for increased use of dam trading. The Federal
Power Act's mandate for license approvals to comport with
"comprehensive plans" provides an obvious foundation for the
planning that would precede development of trading systems.29 '
Similarly, FERC's established, and occasionally used, practice of
consolidating multiple licensing proceedings would provide an
opportunity for more systemic decision-making.292 Indeed, on future
licenses, FERC could draw upon another existing practice, including
reopener clauses in licenses, to align the timing of licensing proceedings
throughout a river basin. 293 FERC already allows off-site mitigation, and
extending that practice to encompass dam-removal mitigation banks
also would be a logical next step. 294 For state-regulated dams, the

potential toolbox is even larger. And we have not uncovered any state

290 EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
rev'd, and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 922
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g granted in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(per curiam) (remanding rule to EPA).
291 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2013).
292 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
293 FERC uses reopener clauses primarily to allow reinitiation of proceedings when
additional fish protection measures become necessary. See Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 32 F.3d 1165 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding this practice
against a challenge from licensees).
294 See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 132 FERC 9161,224, 62,261 (2010) (noting
FERC's willingness to use off-site mitigation).
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laws that would preclude state-regulated dam owners from participating
in trading systems.
The greatest complexities would likely arise with congressionally
authorized, federally owned dams. If Congress has authorized the
creation of a dam for a specific purpose, then additional congressional
action might be necessary to authorize that same dam's removal. 295 But
even that limitation would not preclude the inclusion of federally
owned dams in a trading scheme, for federal dam managers could still
compensate for the impacts of their dams by funding removals of other
dams in other locations. 296 In fact, given the scale of the impacts caused
by federal dams, those federal agencies could become major buyers. 297
2.

Levers and Incentives

A more complicated story emerges from the incentive structures
applicable to dam trading. Environmental trades almost always occur
because some combination of regulatory leverage and financial
incentives induces a redirection of environmentally harmful
behavior. 298 But for dams, these levers and incentives are limited. That
need not preclude trading, but the negative signals make it less likely
and offer promising targets for reform.
a.

Stakes

One of the most important sources of both leverage and incentive is
the presence of high economic and environmental stakes. Simply put,
something that is not economically valuable is not likely to be traded.
Any such system creates transaction costs, and some economic value is
necessary to make shouldering those costs worthwhile. Similarly, if the
environmental stakes are low, there will be little reason to create the
regulatory structures necessary to support a trading system.
295 A series of cases involving the Buford Dam, which lies at the center of one of the
Southeast's largest water disputes, exemplifies the potential complexity of the legal
regime for federally owned dams. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160,
1167-78 (11th Cir. 2011) (summarizing the controversy and prior rounds of prior
litigation).
296 See 33 U.S.C. § 2283 (2013) ("After consultation with appropriate Federal and
non-Federal agencies, the Secretary is authorized to mitigate damages to fish and
wildlife resulting from any water resources project under his jurisdiction .... ").
297 See HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at 1 (discussing the size of different classes of
dams).
298 See generally Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private
Property Solution, 78 U. COLo. L. REV. 533, 570-76 (2007) (explaining how regulatory
caps allow environmental trading systems to function).
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The importance of high stakes also may seem rather obvious, but it is
worth emphasizing for a simple reason. With dams, the economic stakes
are not accidental byproducts of some invisible hand, but instead are
determined in large part by law. Energy markets are heavily subsidized
and sometimes heavily regulated, and the combination of subsidies,
regulatory constraints, and regulatory exemptions plays a significant
role in determining prices. 299 If competing energy sources like coal and
oil can continue to externalize many of their environmental costs, their
prices will remain relatively low, and hydropower's competitive
position will suffer.300 But if climate regulation or even more traditional
Clean Air Act implementation leads to tougher controls on fossil fuel
emissions, the economic appeal of hydropower should rise. 30 1 Similarly,
if more states adopt renewable portfolio standards or other energy
pricing incentives that include hydropower, then energy suppliers will
be willing to pay a premium for hydropower. 30 2 Those changes in turn
30 3
should accelerate interest in upgrading dams and other waterworks.
That could simply entrench existing dams, even if their environmental
impacts are substantial. But increases in the economic value of
hydropower also could generate profits that then could be tapped to
support environmental mitigation. In short, the fate of dam trading is
closely linked to climate and energy policy more generally, and among
the many potential benefits of more progressive energy laws could be a
more dynamic approach to dams.
The importance of high stakes does come with one caveat: for the
trading system to work, those stakes cannot be equally high everywhere.
If every dam has a similar ratio of social benefit to environmental harm,
there will be little to gain from trades. 304 Only where significant
disparities exist - in other words, where some dams produce much more
positive social value for each increment of environmental harm than
others - will there be an incentive to trade upgrades or maintenance at
299 See generally Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to
Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679 (2012) (cataloguing ways in which existing
law favors fossil fuel energy).
300 See id. at 1696, 1702-19 (cataloguing legal advantages enjoyed by fossil fuels).
301 See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON
REGULATION FOR GREEN POWER MARKETS 2 (2007).
302 See generally Lincoln Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment:
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs, 1 KOREA LEGIS. RES. INST.J.L. & LEGIS.
40 (2011) (explaining how renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs function).
303 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 51 (showing hundreds of nonpowered dams across the nation).
304 See generally Hahn & Stavins, supra note 250, at 6 (noting the importance of
disparities in compliance costs).
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the higher value dams for removals at the lower-value sites. For dams,
such disparities of value clearly do exist. 30 5 In general, larger dams tend
to produce more positive and negative impacts than smaller ones. But the
relationships are not uniform, and the American landscape is heavily
populated with dams that produce significant environmental impacts
30 6
while providing few public benefits, if any at all.

In short, the stakes already weigh in favor of dam trading. And if
energy and environmental law generally move toward greater regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions or conventional air pollutants, the stakes
could become even more favorable.
b.

Regulatory Leverage

While high stakes and disparities in value are necessary for a
successful trading regime, they are by no means sufficient. Potential
traders will generally need additional incentives for participation, and
those incentives generally come from some combination of regulatory
sticks and financial carrots. With dams, some of those sticks and carrots
exist, but the resulting incentives are mixed and uneven.
The importance of carrots and sticks arises from a simple problem:
Often an activity that has high costs for society as a whole does not have
high costs for the people actually engaged in that activity, usually
because the actors are able to externalize those costs. Until those costs
become the focus of either regulatory limitations, positive financial
incentives, or both, the actors will have little reason to participate in a
trading scheme. That simple principle explains why a regulatory cap is
a key element of most environmental trading schemes: it is the simplest,
though by no means the only, way of creating that regulatory push.
Dam management is by no means immune from this need for incentives.
A high-environmental-impact, low-value, non-powered dam might seem
like an optimal candidate for participation in a trading scheme designed
to encourage upgrades or removals. But if the dam's owner does not bear
the cost of those environmental impacts, his participation in a trading
scheme is unlikely. 30 7 The incentives are even lower if the dam owner faces
305

See, e.g.,

ERIK

H.

MARTIN

&

COLIN

D.

APSE,

CHESAPEAKE

FISH PASSAGE

PRIORITIZATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF DAMS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED 26 (2013)
(prioritizing dams on the basis of "ecological benefit"); MARTIN & APSE, NORTHEAST
AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47, at 29-30 (prioritizing dams on the basis of

environmental impact).
306 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
307 The Edwards Dam story illustrates this dynamic. While the dam made little
economic sense, its owners were only willing to consider removal when confronted with
a combination of legal threats and financial carrots. See Crane, supra note 130, at 135-
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no safety-related obligations, does not pay to insure the dam, and (as is
entirely plausible in some states) does not even need to provide public
information about the dam.308 For that reason, some regulatory

compulsion for dam owners to internalize the negative impacts of their
dams is a key element of a successful trading scheme. 309
Existing dam law does an uneven job of providing those incentives.
No federal or state law creates an overall cap on any of the
environmental impacts of dams, and environmental limits instead
derive from a patchwork of legal obligations. Those obligations are
strongest during FERC relicensing processes, when the combination of
extensive procedural requirements and multiple environmental law
levers creates a powerful incentive for dam owners to consider whether
continued operation of a dam really is worthwhile. 3 10 But even the
FERC process contains countervailing incentives, including a default
preference toward preserving dams, and FERC itself has been reluctant
to actually order dam removals. 311 Recent congressional changes have
been designed primarily to weaken regulatory leverage over dams, and
those changes undermine dam owners' incentives to account for their
projects' negative effects. 312 In the long periods between licensing
processes, the incentives toward maintaining the status quo are even
more powerful. 31 3 Unless FERC or another regulatory agency invokes a
"reopener" clause and reconsiders license terms, dam owners are largely
exempt from regulatory reexamination during those long interim
periods. 314 Consequently, a set of moderately favorable incentives can
exist, but only once every several decades.
For federal dams that are not regulated by FERC, the incentives
toward maintaining the status quo are similar, if not more powerful. No
relicensing process exists, and once Congress authorizes a federally

43; see also Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38, at 1073-76 (describing how legal leverage

and federal funding facilitated the removal of the Savage Rapids Dam in Oregon).
308 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
309 Financial payments could substitute for regulatory leverage - if sufficient money
is available. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 268-94 (2000) (describing acquisition programs and their
funding challenges).
310 See supra notes 113-42 and accompanying text.
311 See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (2013).
312 See Amos, supra note 136, at 9-13.
313 See 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2013) (authorizing up to fifty-year license terms).
314 See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 472 F.3d
593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that ongoing dam operations under a federal
license did not require ESA consultation).
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315
owned dam, the default presumption is that it will remain in place.
Indeed, making significant changes to dam operations might actually be
precluded by the dam's authorizing legislation. 3 16 Nor does any statute
prescribe a process for concurrently evaluating the status of multiple
dams, and therefore considering how multi-dam systems might be
realigned. That does not mean that federal dams, once built, are exempt
from regulatory oversight. Perhaps most importantly, dam operations
remain subject to the ESA, and consultation processes may lead to
significant new constraints. 31 7 But both procedural and substantive
levers for reconsidering dam operations are significantly weaker than
they are for FERC-regulated dams.
For state-regulated dams, those levers are generally weakest of all. As
discussed above, few states have any procedural requirement for reexamining the environmental impacts of existing dams - unless

someone proposes to make a change to the dam. 318 In many states,

substantive environmental constraints on those operations are similarly
sparse; while a few states have potentially important environmental
requirements for existing dams, in many those dams' environmental
impacts are largely unregulated. 3 19 Safety regulation could be a
substitute incentive, but in many states, that regulation exists largely on
paper. 320 That does not mean state dam owners are entirely immune to
legal leverage. Even absent coverage under regulatory programs, the
potential tort liability associated with a failing dam might be incentive
enough for a landowner to take some action.321 The willingness of
government agencies and environmental groups to pay for dam removal
also provides an important lever, though one limited by the sizes of
government and private purses. 322 But the reality in many states is that

315 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
316 We are not aware of any court that has so held, and there are potential legal
arguments to the contrary. But cases from other contexts illustrate how authorizing
legislation can constrain dam operations. See, e.g., In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig.,
644 F.3d 1160, 1186-92 (11th Cir. 2011) (providing a detailed analysis of authorizing
legislation for the Buford Dam).
317 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (describing controversies surrounding
California's Yuba River).
318 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
321 See generally Engberg, supra note 178, at 188-91 (discussing tort liabilities
associated with dams).
322 See generally Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38 (describing multiple dam
removals that involved infusions of government money).
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the path of least resistance, even for a dam with high environmental
impacts and very little social value, is to simply leave it in place.
Incentives to upgrade dams, and add additional or new hydropower
capacity, are stronger but still quite uneven. The potential profits from
electricity sales are one incentive, particularly where renewable
incentive programs elevate the price for that electricity. 323 Similarly,
recent federal interest in new hydropower capacity may spur some
development.324 But we found very few legal processes designed to
promote the positive externalities of hydropower. FERC, for example,
does not tell its relicensing applicants, "your equipment is old and
underperforming, and we won't grant this license unless you make
changes to generate more hydropower." Nor do dams, or other
renewable energy projects, get any special treatment through NEPA or
ESA processes because of their potential benefits for air quality and
climate.325 Similarly, few, if any, states have programs designed to
identify promising locations for new hydropower installations or
upgrades. 326 Consequently, dam owners' easiest course of action is often
to preserve not just the environmental but also the energy status quo.
The consequence of these uneven incentives is a fragmented
regulatory terrain only weakly conducive to trading. The FERC process
does provide relatively strong incentives, and when the relicensing
process is impending or in progress, dam owners might be particularly
interested in identifying other dam removals that could serve as
mitigation. 327 And there might be many other dams nearby that could
be part of an environmentally and economically sensible deal. But
without substantial increases in, and adjustments to, regulatory
oversight, the other dam owners will have little regulatory incentive to
participate in such deals, even if their dams produce little economic or
societal value, and are likely to become involved only if the offering
price is sufficiently high. Sometimes it may be, but both private and
public funds for environmental restoration are fairly limited.
Consequently, while the Penobscot project succeeded largely because
many dams were part of the discussion, the existing regulatory system
misses most opportunities for recreating that circumstance.
See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 51 (finding potential for new
development).
325 See J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species
Act Through AdministrativeReform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1788 (2012) (noting that the
ESA does not give wind power a "green pass").
326 In the course of our research, we have not identified any such programs.
327 See supra notes 113-48 and accompanying text (describing the FERC process).
323

324
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Information

A third key element in the success of almost any trading scheme is
governmental procurement, management, and dissemination of
information. For dam trading, that poses a serious challenge, and, again,
a potential focus for reforms.
The claim that trading systems necessitate information management
may initially sound surprising, for some of the early literature on trading
suggested otherwise. Much like other market systems, the thinking
went, a trading system could draw upon the knowledge of many
dispersed actors, significantly reducing the knowledge burdens placed
upon centralized government regulators. 328 Decades later, however, the
bloom is off that rose. Regulators have learned that setting the initial
rules for trading systems, determining whether trades actually would be
environmentally protective, and verifying that traders are following
through on their commitments all can be information-intensive
exercises. 329 Without the requisite information, a trading system can fail
330
to fulfill its environmentally protective goals, or can simply collapse.
The informational challenges of environmental trading systems
331
derive largely from the necessity of trading incommensurable things.
Most of the items that environmental traders deal are not fully fungible.
For air pollutants, for example, location usually matters; a decrease in
emissions in a downwind area may not offset an increase farther
upwind, even if the amounts are exactly the same. 332 For wetlands and
habitat trading programs, the non-fungibility problems are even more
acute. 333 No two wetlands, forests, or meadows are exactly the same,
and a wide variety of geographic, ecological, and social factors will
determine whether the habitat that is created or preserved offers
reasonable compensation for the habitat destroyed. 334 That creates a

328 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Market Incentives, supra note 30, at 180 (arguing
that a tradable permits system "would immediately eliminate most of the information
processing tasks that are presently overwhelming the federal and state bureaucracies").
329 For a general discussion of the role of information in environmental trading
systems, see Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 267-73.
330 See Susan Walker et al., Why BarteringBiodiversity Fails,2 CONSERVATION LETTERS
149, 154 (2009).
331 Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24, at 622-30
(describing the prevalence of non-fungibility).
332 See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Tradingand Environmental Injustice:
Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231,
252 (1999).
333 See Salzman & Ruhl, No Net Loss, supra note 32, at 330-36.
334 See Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24, at 612
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potentially enormous challenge for trading systems: how does one
obtain and process the information necessary to determine whether
trades are adequate, or compensate for that information's absence?
Existing trading programs address these issues in several ways, each
somewhat flawed. One is to measure trades by using some simple
currency - pounds of C0 2 e, 33 5 for example, or acres of wetlands - and
to ignore any incommensurability that the currency fails to capture. 336
That approach lowers transaction costs, but, unfortunately, it also can

routinely place environmental protection on the losing side of deals. 337

Alternatively, regulators can establish trading ratios - that is, they can
require 10 acres of protection for each acre of loss, to compensate for
potential unevenness - or they can review each trade to make sure it
offers fair value.338 Both approaches

offer better assurances of

environmental protection, but the costs to regulated entities are
higher. 339 Indeed, if the regulators' information demands are sufficiently
high, deals may not be worth pursuing at all.
These informational complexities raise a related challenge: addressing
them often requires specialized expertise. There are some
environmental trading systems that function like an economist's
idealized market, with arms-length, low-transaction cost deals
somewhat akin to traditional stock or bond trades. 340 But even those
markets require tremendous effort to create. In other environmental
trading systems -

wetlands again are a good example -

each trade

tends to require oversight and review. 341 That in turn creates the need
for experience-based knowledge, both among the traders and the

(arguing that wetlands trading historically involved too much tolerance for nonfungible trades).
335 CO 2e stands for CO 2 equivalent, which is the metric of choice for greenhouse gas
trading.
336 See B. Kelsey Jack et al., Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services: Lessons from
Previous Experience with Incentive-Based Mechanisms, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 9465,
9467 (2008) (noting the role of proxy measures in environmental trading systems).
337 See Tietenberg, supra note 25, at 87 (noting that traders will generally seek the
lowest-cost transaction without regard to environmental benefits).
338 See Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 267-68.
339 See id.
340 See, e.g., Acid Rain Program S02 Allowances Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/factsheet.html (describing the
program).
341 See Morgan Robertson, The Work of Wetland Credit Markets: Two Cases in
Entrepreneurial Wetland Banking, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 35, 47 (2009)
(explaining how wetlands banking requires human contact and site-specific expertise).

20151

1099

Trading Dams

regulators. 342 Traders will need the ability to predict what sort of deal
will be approved, lest the system be untenably uncertain, and regulators
will need some basis for judging quickly whether a trade is satisfactory,
lest they approve unreasonable deals or drive up costs by making slow
decisions. These problems are not insurmountable, but addressing them
takes time and effort.
For dam trading, these informational challenges are potentially
substantial. Each dam is embedded in a unique context, and the
significant effects, both positive and negative, of dam removals will
generally ensure the need for ample information about any potential
trade. The intricacies of river ecology contribute to those complexities,
and the webs of human interests associated with dams also can take time
to sort out. Particularly in western states, where water is relatively
scarce, dams are likely to be embedded in complex legal regimes of
property rights in water and land. 34 3 Even beyond those rights, the

normal human tendency to view a river or a reservoir as a community
resource creates a need to gather information about, inform, and
respond to public preferences. 344 Dam trading also is an almost
completely new concept (and our recent emphasis on dam removal isn't
much older), and that too creates challenges. Agency guidance on dam
trading is nearly non-existent, and the decades-long learning processes
that inform air quality and wetlands trading have barely begun to
occur. 345 Even with the Penobscot project as a potential model, any

entity embarking on a dam trading exercise would still be a pioneer.
Nevertheless, these challenges could become more manageable.
Perhaps most importantly, scientists and engineers can analyze river
346
systems in ways that weren't possible twenty or thirty years ago.

342 See, e.g., id. (highlighting the role of discretionary judgment in wetlands
mitigation banking.
343 For a general description of those laws, and they ways they can constrain changes
in water use, see BARTON H. THOMPSON ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 167443 (5th ed. 2013).
344 See NewJersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) ("A river is more than an
amenity, it is a treasure."). As one would-be dam trader explained to us, "[t]he main
challenge I found was that each dam has such unique and intricate characteristics and
even when there's no clear title, or it's been abandoned, the surrounding community
feels a 'claim' on it, as a historical or cultural heritage ...." Email from James G.
Workman to Dave Owen, Professor of Law, Univ. of Me. Law Sch. (Dec. 5, 2011, 12:02
AM EST) (on file with author).
345 We have found only one example of such guidance. See infra notes 354-56 and
accompanying text.
346 For general discussion of advances in computer-based river system modeling, see
CONVERGING
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Using geographic information systems and computer-based modeling,
water resource planners have begun creating prioritization maps that
identify dams that ought to be prime ecological candidates for
removal. 347 Other studies have moved beyond single-dam prioritization
lists and developed optimization systems, which are designed to identify
what sequence of dam changes will best balance competing goals. 348

Several more recent studies have broadened the scope of the analysis,
attempting to identify environmental and hydropower opportunities
throughout entire river basins. 349 All of these trends reflect water
planners' increasing reliance on sophisticated basin-scale modeling,
which can allow planners to identify management approaches that
optimize multiple competing goals.350 The changes also aren't just
technocratic. As dam removals become increasingly prevalent,
communities are beginning to appreciate the values associated with
restoring free-flowing rivers.351
The resulting studies could benefit dam trading operations in
multiple ways. Initially, they could help identify dams that should be
targets for mitigation or upgrades. 352 That identification might be done
by the potential traders themselves or by third-party advocacy
organizations. Alternatively, regulators might use basin-scale modeling
to help pre-define the rules of a trading system. By identifying targeted
locations for mitigation projects, and by predetermining the credits

PROCESSES TO MAKE WATER RESOURCE DECISIONS (Lisa Bourget ed., 2011) [hereinafter
CONVERGING WATERS].
347 See, e.g., MARTIN & APSE, NORTHEAST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47

(creating such priority systems for rivers in the northeastern United States).
348 See generally Kemp & O'Hanley, supra note 94 (summarizing this literature).
349 See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 237 (reporting on the Basin-Scale
Opportunity Assessment initiative); Geerlofs et al., supra note 40 (discussing the
Deschutes River Basis, a pilot basin to test the Basic Scale Opportunities Assessment).
350 See generally CONVERGING WATERS, supra note 346 (providing multiple examples
of watershed-scale modeling). For cautionary studies discussing the limits of
environmental modeling, see James D.Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy:
Conflicts Between Modeling and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 901, 921-38 (2005); and Wendy Wagner et al., MisunderstandingModels
in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293,316-45 (2010).
351 See, e.g., Bill Provencher et al., Does Small Dam Removal Affect Local Property
Values? An Empirical Analysis, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 187, 187 (2008) (finding that
dam removal is value-neutral for riparian parcels and increases value for other nearby
parcels); see also Sara E. Johnson & Brian E. Graber, Enlisting the Social Sciences in
Decisions About Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 731, 733-36 (2008) (describing
techniques for enlisting community support).
352 See, e.g., MARTIN & APSE, NORTHEAST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47
(creating a prioritization system to support such decisions).
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associated with those projects, they could create greater certainty for
future traders, lowering the transaction costs and accelerating the
operations of the trading system. 353 Alternatively, modeling might help
regulators define more sophisticated currencies for dam trading
systems. By moving beyond relatively simple metrics, like river miles,
and instead using metrics that integrate multiple values, regulators
might direct system participants toward higher-value trades.
For trading to succeed, however, sophisticated informational tools are
certainly not enough. Potential traders also need guidance on how that
information base would be integrated into regulatory decision-making.
Here, as well, some nascent efforts show promise. Perhaps the most
intriguing comes from North Carolina, where state environmental
agencies and the Army Corps of Engineers have begun to develop
trading ratios when dam removal projects are used as mitigation for
filling streams. 354 Their initiative was limited (and short-lived); 355 they
only contemplated trades in which dam removals would create credits
for filling streams, and not for other activities like maintaining other
existing dams. 356 But the basic concept could be refined and extended
to other forms of trades; for example, similar guidance could govern
trades in which dam removal compensates for other habitat-impacting
activities. 357 These initial efforts are just a beginning; the decades-long
and still-ongoing process of developing the wetlands trading program
demonstrates just how much guidance and experience may ultimately
be necessary. 35 8 But they still provide promising signs.
In conclusion, the need for information creates big challenges and
important reform opportunities for dam management. With rare
353 See Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 268-73 (explaining how up-front
planning can help regulators design environmental trading systems).
354 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ET AL., DETERMINING APPROPRIATE COMPENSATORY
MITIGATION CREDIT FOR DAM REMOVAL PROJECTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1-20 (2008).
355 See Public Notice, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, WILMINGTON DIST. (May 7, 2012)
(withdrawing the guidance).
356 Some scientists might also criticize their currency as crude, for it focuses

primarily on linear miles of restored streams. See Lave et al., supra note 278, at 288
(claiming reliance on linear stream length as the sole currency "is deeply problematic").
But the guidance does identify additional adjustment factors, and dam removers can
obtain additional credit by monitoring the recovery of the undammed stream system.
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ET AL., supra note 354, at 6-13.
357

See, e.g., Dave Owen, CriticalHabitatand the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms,

64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 193-94 (2012) [hereinafter CriticalHabitat] (suggesting that dam
removals might be used to mitigate impacts to endangered species' critical habitat).
358 See, e.g., Tammy Hill et al., Compensatory Stream and Wetland Mitigationin North
Carolina: An Evaluation of Regulatory Success, 51 ENVTL. MGMT. 1077 (2013)
(documenting improving performance).
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exceptions, existing informational systems are not robust enough to
support extensive trading. And some informational challenges probably
always will remain; environmental trades involving dams will always
face more friction than those involving sulfur dioxide emissions, for
example, and the unique context of each dam will necessitate some sitespecific tailoring of each trade. But a combination of evolving
information technology and increasing experience could make
information demands less of a barrier, particularly if regulators take
active steps toward developing a stronger informational base.
IV.

INTEGRATING REFORMS: A MODEL PROGRAM

The preceding discussion identifies a variety of challenges and implies
many reforms. To bring our reform ideas into focus, we therefore close
with a sketch of a model reform program. For several reasons, we focus
on states (though some analogous changes could occur at the federal
level). First, state dam laws have tremendous room for improvement.
As discussed above, state dam law is often highly underdeveloped, and
what law exists is not always implemented in any meaningful way.359
Second, in the literature on dams, states have received the least
attention. Consequently, while we think promising reforms could and
should occur at the federal level,360 the prescriptions that follow explain
what a thoughtful state might do with its dams.
If implemented, the reforms below should help facilitate the trading
of dams. But, as we have discussed, dam trading will still present

359 See supra notes 165-90 and accompanying text.
360 While a full description of these recommendations is beyond the scope of this
paper, we think several federal reforms offer promise: (1) FWS and NMFS could issue
guidance on using dam removals as mitigation for impacts to endangered species; (2)
FWS could use endangered species recovery planning as a platform for developing
basin-scale restoration plans. Those plans could identify opportunities and
mitigation values - for dam removals, and could also identify overall caps on damrelated species impacts; (3) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could develop guidance
documents on using dam removal to mitigate the impacts of filling wetlands and
waterways; (4) FERC could reserve authority to reopen licenses whenever a basin-scale
planning effort is underway; (5) FERC could adjust the duration of licenses so that
multiple facilities on the same river come up for relicensing at the same time; (6) FERC
could impose system benefits charges on all hydropower operators to create a funding
base for basin-scale planning; (7) Integrating and expanding upon the preceding ideas,
FERC, other federal agencies, and state agencies could create procedures for "general
dam adjudications," which would concurrently address the environmental impacts of
dams throughout a river system; (8) FERC could create a revolving planning fund,
which would be replenished by charging a portion of the profits of dams allowed to
remain in place. We are indebted to Richard Roos-Collins for that last suggestion.
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challenges, and improvements in dam management would be possible
even in the absence of trades. For that reason, we have emphasized
reforms that would encourage trading but would also produce more
sensible dam management even if true trading systems do not emerge.
A.

Environmental Regulation

An effective dam policy requires regulatory sticks, and on that front
states have ample room for improvement. At a minimum, a state dam
regulatory program ought to include three elements.
The first, and most important, step would be to create environmental
performance requirements for existing dams. While states might choose
to establish lower performance standards for existing facilities, or might
choose to phase those requirements in, there is no compelling reason to
grant environmentally destructive facilities near-permanent exemptions
from environmental law. 361 Second, and relatedly, the state should

create periodic procedural opportunities for re-examining the status of
dams. Here, the FERC relicensing process provides a useful starting
point, though shorter license terms would be preferable, as would
schedules creating concurrent review processes for all dams within a
watershed. 362 Rivers, dams, and societal needs all change over time, and
a relicensing process provides a valuable opportunity to examine
whether a dam still makes sense, or whether it should be operated
differently, or removed. Third, and finally, the state should have a
363
meaningful dam safety program that actually gets implemented.
Dams do fail, sometimes with tragic consequences, and a failure to
monitor dam conditions therefore is a public safety problem as well as
364
a missed opportunity to reconsider dams' existence or operations.
All of these recommendations might raise one question: do states
have the power to make these changes? Legally, at least, the answer
should be a clear yes. Dams and the associated water rights do implicate
systems of property law, and to many people, property rights connote
permanence. 365 But property rights nearly always are subject to

361 For a summary of problems with long-term grandfathering, see Bruce R. Huber,
Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 93-94 (2011).
362 See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (explaining problems caused by
long license periods and staggered review obligations).
363 See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text (critiquing state programs).
364 See Why Dams Fail, FEMA (July 24, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/why-dams-fail
(describing several prominent failures).
365 See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) ("Water rights are property." (emphasis added)).
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reasonable regulation, and that has been particularly true of rights that
implicate water resources and wildlife. 366 Dams themselves fall well
within that tradition. Even at the time of the Founding Fathers, statutes
requiring fish passage and, sometimes, dam removals were quite
prevalent. 367 James Madison himself sponsored one such law, and the
Framers appeared to view those laws as entirely compatible with
property law. 368 That compatibility should persist to the present day,

and should offer states ample latitude for more robust regulatory
369
governance.
B.

Information

While legal constraints are essential to the success of any trading
schemes, softer forms of regulation also have key roles to play. Most
importantly, a reform-minded state could improve its dam policy by
providing more information about dams.
A model dam information program would include several elements.
At the most basic levels, states could maintain more thorough dam
inventories, which include the results of recent environmental and
safety reviews, and make the information in those inventories publicly
available. States also could work with federal agencies and non-profits,
many of which already are engaged in mapping projects to identify fish
passage impediments and sites with hydropower potential, to make the
results of their studies available on-line.370 And, more ambitiously,

366 See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) ("Rights,
property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the world are certainly rare, and
water rights are not among them."). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen,
The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1451-65 (discussing how sovereign
ownership of wildlife empowers governmental regulation); Brian E. Gray, The Property
Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 1, 4 (2002) (discussing the

inherent malleability of water rights); Sax, supra note 365 (discussing regulation of
water rights).
367 See generally Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison, supra note 89 (describing this
prevalence).
368 See id. at 289-90; see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance
for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) (arguing that land
use regulation has been pervasive since the colonial era).
369 See generally Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253 (2014)
(providing doctrinal and theoretical arguments for extensive regulatory authority over
water use).
370 See, e.g., Maine Stream Habitat Viewer, ME. STREAM CONNECTIVITY WORKGROUP &
ME. OFFICE OF GIS, http://mapserver.maine.gov/streamviewer/streamdocHome.html
(last visited Jan. 9, 2014) (displaying stream-dependent species, dams, and public road
crossings to teach the public about stream habitats in the state).
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states could sponsor and disseminate (or require dam owners to fund)
basin-scale dam optimization studies, and could make those studies
available for public review. 371 All of these changes still would leave
information gaps, for the complexity of river systems would ensure that
some key information is left out. But they would at least provide wouldbe dam traders with information about which dams to target and which
people to contact.
C.

Trading System Guidance

The state also could provide informational support in another key
way. Established environmental trading systems often are supported by
detailed, pre-specified rules and ample agency guidance. 372 The Army
Corps of Engineers and EPA, for example, have spent years refining and
explaining their approaches to wetlands mitigation, and the resulting
guidance has helped create predictability and build public- and privatesector expertise. 373 If dam trading is to succeed, a similar level of effort
will be necessary.
States could offer that guidance in several ways. First, following the
recent example of North Carolina, they could pre-specify generic
currencies and trading ratios for mitigation projects involving dam
removals. 374 Second, they could study river basins, identify potential
removal and upgrade sites, and establish basin-specific or even damspecific trading ratios. Third, if states decide that pre-set currencies and
trading ratios are too crude to capture the environmental complexities
of dam systems, they at least could set forth criteria and procedures for
reviewing potential trades. Absent that sort of guidance, each dam trade
will be a one-off exercise, with all the time, costs, and risks associated
with doing something almost completely new. With it, potential trade
participants will at least have a set of structured expectations and a
starting point for institutional learning.
For the state, fulfilling this recommendation will not be easy. Any set
of trading system rules will necessarily ignore some of the complexity
of the real world, and thus will allow traders to dismiss some

371 The federal government's studies of the Deschutes, Connecticut, and Roanoke
basins provide one model for such studies. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
372 See, e.g., Compensatory Mitigation, EPA (Mar. 20, 2014), http://water.epa.gov/
lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/wetlandsmitigation-index.cfm (providing links to a library
of guidance documents).
373 See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text (describing this evolution).
374 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ET AL., supra note 354.
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consequences that reasonable people would care about. 375 For that

reason, the scientists involved in basin-scale studies often seem quite
reluctant to translate any of their recommendations into policy
prescriptions. But some messiness is an unavoidable component of any
regulatory system, including the status quo.376 The key question, then,
is not whether a trading system would involve serious flaws; no doubt
it would. Instead, it is whether trades could improve on existing legal
systems that leave a problematic status quo largely entrenched. The
answer to that question might well be yes, and until innovations are
tested, no one will know.
D. InstitutionalSupport
Implicit in all the suggestions we have made thus far are two more
recommendations. First, the state needs to have people who come to
work thinking about improved dam systems. Second, the state needs to
pay for those people's work.
The former recommendation is important because dam regulation
requires policy innovation, and innovation is not the sort of thing that
can be automated. Instead, all of the steps we have described require
human expertise and judgment. And these steps are just the tip of the
iceberg, for implementing an improved dam removal program will
necessarily require working with other state agencies, federal agencies,
local governments and communities, water users, the hydropower
industry, other dam owners, and environmental non-profits. The track
records of state dam programs bear this out. It is no coincidence states
with particularly robust dam removal programs (Pennsylvania, for
example) have had environmental agency staff assigned to dam
management. 377
The latter recommendation follows from the former. In an era of
limited general funds, one cannot simply assume that financial support
for dam management will magically appear, and we recommend that
our model state consider alternative funding mechanisms. One
375 For a detailed development of this critique in the context of water rights trading,
see Freyfogle, supra note 281, at 31-33.
376 See Owen, CriticalHabitat, supra note 357, at 193-94 (explaining how alternatives
to trading systems can present their own problems).
377 See, e.g., Kevin Begos, Report: Pa. Lead Nation in Dam Removal in 2012, YDR.COM
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ydr.com/state/ci_22774060/report-pa-lead-nation-damremoval-2012 (noting recent dam removal projects in Pennsylvania); Waterways

Engineering and Wetlands, PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/

portallserver.ptlcommunity/bureau of waterways..engineeringand wetlands/i 1202
(last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (describing the state DEP's active role in dam removals).
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possibility is a general dam ownership fee, which could be pro-rated to
the scale of the dam. An alternative possibility is a revolving loan fund,
which would use planning to support a mixed program of dam removals
and hydropower upgrades, and then use some of the profits from the
hydropower upgrades to replenish the fund and support new rounds of
hydropower planning. A third, and more ambitious, possibility would
be to impose a fee requirement on some other related activity, like
energy use or water consumption. Obviously all of these possibilities
have their strengths and weaknesses, but the key point is that our state
should avoid the circumstance, presently quite common for dam safety
programs, in which a superficially robust program languishes for lack
378
of financial support.
E.

Pricing Incentives

So far, our recommendations have focused primarily on increasing
environmental constraints upon existing dams. That is appropriate, for
those constraints are presently too weak, but positive incentives also
have a role to play. Some of the most important incentives involve
creating a favorable economic environment for environmentally
sensitive hydropower.
There are several ways to do this. One is to ensure that the
environmental impacts of other energy sources are adequately
regulated. Every subsidy or exemption directed at the fossil fuel
industry, for example, effectively negates an economic edge that
hydropower ought to receive. 379 Similarly, any regulatory program that
prices greenhouse gas emissions, like the northeastern states' Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative or California's AB 32 program, will create
collateral benefits for hydropower. 380 An alternative, or perhaps
complementary, mechanism is to pass a renewable portfolio standard
that includes sustainable hydropower and to use environmental
performance, not size, as the key criterion for inclusion in that
standard. 38 1 Massachusetts already has modeled this approach, and its
378 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
379 See Outka, supra note 299, at 1702-19 (discussing current environmental policies
that give fossil fuels a structural advantage over hydropower).
380 See Assembly Bill 32 Overview, AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 5,

2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (explaining the proposed California
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006); Welcome, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,

http://www.rggi.org (last visited Dec. 17, 2013) (discussing market-based regulatory
program aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emission in the U.S.).
381 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (noting states' tendency to use
size as a key eligibility criterion for pricing incentive programs).
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innovation encourages hydropower while also providing incentives to
3 82
generate that hydropower in relatively sustainable ways.

These reform proposals hardly exhaust the field. But a state that
adopts the program we have described would be taking huge steps
toward a more progressive dam policy, in which exchanges like the
Penobscot River Restoration Project help lead to more sensible uses of
rivers and dams.
CONCLUSION

In a sense, the dams of the Penobscot River all are relics of an earlier
age. The United States stopped building dams during the Reagan
Administration, and in recent decades, there have been few serious
proposals for large-scale dam construction to resume. 383 Nevertheless,
the United States Department of Energy has begun taking bold steps
toward a hydropower revival, and that revival, if it does materialize,
384
could involve extensive new construction.
Meanwhile, in much of the rest of the world, dam building never
really ceased. Hundreds of dams, many of them enormous, are currently
planned across South America, Asia, and Africa. Many national
governments view those planned dams as integral components of their
economic development strategies, and while the judgments informing
these views are sometimes slanted or dubious, the plans nevertheless
are quite real. If those dams are sited and built without regard to
environmental impacts - in other words, if they are built the same way
the dams on the Penobscot, and throughout much of the rest of the
United States, were - the ecological consequences will be devastating.
The dam laws of other nations are not the subject of this Article; our
discussion instead has focused almost entirely upon the United States.
But the still-unfolding international age of dams highlights the
importance of any successful United States reforms. If some

382 To be eligible for Massachusetts's renewable portfolio standard, a dam must be
certified by the Low Impact Hydropower Institute, a private organization. SeeJOHNSON,
supra note 185, at 25-30.
383 See REISNER, supra note 11, at 306-31 (describing the demise of the dam-building
era); Barringer, supra note 11 (describing a major Alaskan dam proposal).
384 See generally SHIH-CHIEH KAO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NEW STREAM-REACH

DEVELOPMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF HYDROPOWER POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED

STATES (2014) (finding enormous potential for new hydropower development).
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hydropower development is inevitable, then there is a glaring and
urgent need for legal mechanisms that will reduce the impacts of those
dams that are built. Environmental trading systems could be one such
mechanism. And there is precedent for imitation, for the United States'
pioneering experiments with environmental trading systems have now
influenced regulatory approaches around the world. 38

5

Dams, then,

could be the next frontier.
We do not claim that crossing that frontier will be easy. Trading
systems will never be a perfect fit for dams, or for river management
more generally. Nor will they be fully effective upon first emergence; in
this realm, as in most areas of regulatory policy, learning will take time.
But the restoration of the Penobscot illustrates how the concept of
trading holds promise.

385 See generally MADSEN ET AL., supra note 246 (describing the global proliferation
of environmental trading systems).

